Western Michigan University

ScholarWorks at WMU
Master's Theses
11-1966

Budget Effects on Defense Planning
Charles Ventura

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/masters_theses
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Ventura, Charles, "Budget Effects on Defense Planning" (1966). Master's Theses. 4978.
https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/masters_theses/4978

This Masters Thesis-Open Access is brought to you for
free and open access by the Graduate College at
ScholarWorks at WMU. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks at WMU. For more information, please
contact wmu-scholarworks@wmich.edu.

Graduate College

-BUDGET EFFECTS ON DEFENSE PLANNING

by
Charles Ventura

A Thesis submitted to the
Faculty of the School of Graduate
Studies in partial fulfillment
of the
Degree of Master of Arts

Western Michigan Universit�
Kalamazoo, Michigan
November 1966

I'

PREFACE
The Department of Defense (DOD) program budget was developed to
link defense planning to defense spending.

The budget is designed to

reflect total program costs. Military managers require such costs in
order to make optimum allocation of resources.

The program budget

has been a useful tool in bringing uniformity to military plans but
its effectiveness, the author contends, has been limited because it
contains inaccurate cost data.
The author intends to prove that incorrect financial informa
tion is included in the budget because some_ resource expenditures
cannot be accurately traced.
eral different weapon systems.

The same resource is "conunon" to sev
It is not possible to separate and to

apportion these common assets, in ·proper proportion, to the programs
which actually consume the resources.

Current defense management and

funding pro�edures, in the author's opinion, prevent correct cost
allocations • . Consequently, such expenditures are pro-rated and
actual system costs are never compiled or reported.
The purpose of this paper is to describe the reasons for inac
curate reporting and to reconvnend a solution to the problem. Accept
ance of this solution will permit the basic tool for military plan
ning, the program budget, to correctly reflect total program costs.
The use of the more accurate data will enhance defense decision
making and improve this nation's military posture.
i

The Air Force

Logistics Corranand (AF1.C), the largest military organization managing
common resources, is used as the example for this study.

The author

believes that the problems that AFLC has in supporting the program
budget are experienced by all military units which control cormnon
assets.

The corranand's mission and operation are investigated to

prove that accurate resource accounting cannot be accomplished within
the current funding technique.

After isolating the problem areas, a

basic funding revision is recommended which the author believes will
provide accurate program costs.
The author gratefully aclmowledges the contributions that Mr.
Raymond Kristy, AFLC Supply �alyst, made to this paper.

Mr. Kristy

first brought the problem of incompatible accounting to the author's
attention and performed extensive research to support the views
expressed in this paper.
Charles E. Ventura
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CHAPTER I
THE PROGRAM BUDGET
Background of Programming System
Early in 1961 the Department of Defense (DOD) initiated a new
planning and programming process for achieving this nation's security
objectives.

The new system was an attempt to bridge the gap netween

military planni�g, accomplished by the separate military departments,
and military spending, accomplished by budget personnel.

Prior to

President Kennedy's administration there had been no successful at
tempts at defining defense objectives in program and budget terms.
The new system's objective was to do this in order to assist deci
sion-making in the Defense Department.
The critically important functions of planning and budgeting
were performed by two different groups of people.

Planning was ac

complished by the military planners and the budgeting was done by the
civilian secretaries and their comptroller organizations.

The divi

sion was further compounded by the fact that each department acted
unilaterally in both objectives and financial activities.

J.

Charles

Hitch, forrrer Defense Comptrolle�, explicitly made this point

when he said:
Each service tended to exercise its own priorities, favoring
its own unique missions to the detriment of joint missions,
striving to lay groundwork for an increased share of the budg
et in future years by concentrating on alluring newveapon
1

2

systems, and protecting the over-all size of its own forces
even at the cost of readiness. These decisions were made by
patriotic generals and admirals, and dedicated civilian leaders
as well,who were convinced that they were acting in the best
interests of the Nation as well as of their own service - �ut
the end result was not balanced effective military forces.
The departments each had a separate concept of the "next war"
and therefore planned requirements for divergent military objectives.
The DOD responded to the criticism of disjointed defense objectives in 1956 by initiating the first Joint Strategic Objectives Plan
{JSOP). The JSOP,prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization,
projected major force requireirents some four or five years in the
future. Planning was extended from a year-to-year basis. The docu
ment contained each military service's projected needs. It was the
first attempt to embody all defense requirements,for an extended
period, in one comprehensive plan. The JSOP in theory was a sound
planning document but for several reasons it did not provide the
comprehensive picture of the defense organization's unified objec- _
tives or future directions. Essentially it was a pasting together of
unilaterally developed service plans. Charles Hitch,after examining
this situation; commented:
Planning was performed in terms of missions,weapon systems,
and military units or forces - the "outputs" of the Defense
Department; budgeting,on the other hand,was done in terms of
such "inputs" or immediate products as personnel,operation
and maintenance,procurement,construction,etc.; and there
was little or no machinery for translating one into the other.2

-----------------------------------------------------�----1charles J. Hitch, Decision-Making for Defense (Berk�ley and
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965),p. 24.
2Ibid.,p. 26.
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The JSOP tended to reflect unattainable goals.

The military

requirements were stated in force tenns without reference to cost.
The JSOP always far exceeded any budget that the administration:
would request and therefore did not have a significant impact in
unifying defense objectives·.
The individual department's comptroller organization, respon
sible for budget submission, was faced with the fact- that each service
received a rather fixed percentage of the defense budget.

Congress

"stabilized the ,allocation of funds among the three services •. Begin
ning in 1951, and continued throughout the next nine years, the Air
Force received 47 percent of the budget, the Navy approximately 29

percent and the Anny about 22 percent."1 Each year the services would
receive rigid budget guidelines which controlled their growth and
direction.

These guidelines were set with little knowledge of their

strategic implications because the budget people simply did not have
knowledge of military strategy.

In essence, decision-making was left

to those who were not qualified to make such a choice.
General Maxwel+ D. Taylor, later to be Joint Chief of Staff,
complained of the fact that budget and plans were incompatible.
Before the

u.s.

Senate in 1961 he stated:

As a matter of fact, it is very difficult to determine their
implications beca�se of the way in which the defense budget is
constructed. In spite of the fact that modern war is no
longer fought in terms of a separate Anny, Navy and Air Force,
nonetheless we still budget vertically in these service terms.

------------------�----------------------------------

1william w. Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy (New York:
and Row, Publishers, 1964), p.23.

Harper
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Hence it is not an exaggeration to say that we do not know
what kind and how much defense we are buying with any specific
budget.I
Each of the three services realized the inadequacy of _the pre
vailing dichotomy between planning and budgeting and began projects
to change the situation.

The RAND Corporation, a non-profit research

organization founded with Air Force sponsorship, began to work on the
costing of actual and alternative forces by mission.

In 1954 defi

nite proposals for a mission-oriented fiscal structure were developed
by RAND.

David �ovick, a RAND employee and fonner controller of the

War Production Board in World War II, outlined a new budgeting and
accounting method for the Federal Goverrurent. · Weapon systems were
to be examined for effectiveness in accomplishing missions.

This

was a traditional approach. However, resource cost studies were
coupled with effectivity and, through this cost-effectiveness con
cept, alternative resource allocations would appear.

These choices

were to be investigated as to what inputs produced the most outputs.
Besides cost analysis, budgets were to be prepared by weapon systems
rather than the traditional fuctional categories of personnel, pro-

2
curement, construction and development.

The Navy, by 1958, had

lu.s. Congress, Senate, Subcorranittee on National Policy
Machinery, Committee on Government Operations, Organizing for
National Security, 86th Congress, 2n<iSession (Washington: 1960),
p. 769.

2see David Novick, Efficiency and Economy in Government Through
New Budgeting and Accounting Procedures (Santa Monica: RAND. Corpora
tion, R-254, 1954)
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developed the Polaris-type submarines but could not procure it in
addition to its other shipbuilding requirerrents.

The department

argued that it was not realistic to fiscally treat the submarine
like any other naval vessel because its military mission was unique
in that service.

The Navy contended that the Polaris was actually a

part of the deterrent forces, an instrument of strategic reprisal.
It therefore was more analogous to a Strategic Air Command (SAC)
bomber or Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) than to other
naval vessels.

Since the missions of the Polaris and ICBM were the

same, funds should come from traditional Air Force monies instead of
ship-building appropriations.

The Anny also began to take interest

in mission-oriented budgets when it discovered that the Air Force was
spending most of its new procurement funds on SAC weapons and little
on the ground support weapons of the Tactical Air Command.

Without

extensive air support the Army believed its divisions would not
receive gecessary air support in war conditions.

They also began to

proclaim that military missions should be considered in budget
requests.
Each service recognized a need but nothing was accomplished
until 1961 when Secretary of Defense Roberts. McNamara discovered
the lack of coordination between military plans and budgets.

When

he came into office he found that the three military departments had
been establishing their requirements independently of each other.
He later gave a graphic conunentary on the then prevailing situation:
I think the-results can fairly be described as chaotic.

The
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Army planning for example was based, largely, on a long war of
attrition, while the Air Force planning was based, largely, on
a short war of nuclear bombardment. Consequently, the Army
was stating a requirement for stocking months of fighting
supplies against the event of a sizeable conventional conflict,
while the Air Force stock requirements for such a war had to be
measured in days, and not very many days at that.1
Duplication, besides chaos, was a result of·each service independently determining its requirements. Every military departrrent
spent large sums of money to develop IRBM's and ICBM's although each
of the missiles were to perform very similar missions. Another
example of duplicative effort was the Air Force and Navy development
of an all-weather fighter aircraft. ·During the late fifties four
such aircraft, with the same tactical mission and operational charac
teristics, were developed.

Only two, the F-105 and F-4 were bought

and the development and termination costs of the others were lost,
or wasted.
The entire research and development cost area was not realis
tically �portrayed.
yearly basis.

Cost data were presented to DOD and Congress on a

The full, tire-phased cost of a proposed weapon system,

which generally took about five years, was not stated.
most programs are small in their first year.

The costs of

This led to the start

ing of many projects that could not be simultaneously completed
within amounts close to existing budget levels.

It was "clear that

there were ·a great many wasteful stretch-outs and cancellations of
1Robert s. McNamara, "Decision-Making in the Department of
Defense", Address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors�
Washington D.C., 20 April 1963, DOD Press Release No. 548-63.
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programs that would not have been started if the costs of all of the
approved programs had been anticipated. 11

1

During the 1956 - 1960 period many critics of defense manage
ment stated solutions to military problems.

Many �f the conclusions

were included in one book, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear
Age by Roland N. McKean and Charles

J.

Hitch.

The book was published

by Harvard University Press, Cambridge, in 1960.
worked for the RAND Corporation.

The authors both

The primary thesis of the book was

that all military problems should be considered in economic terms
before rational decision-making could occur.

Economics, in this

case, means the allocation of resources, not the reduction of
expenditures.

The object was to measure inputs against outputs of

defense spending and then to determine whether proper fund alloca
tions had been determined.
each other.

The two could not be measured against

Inputs were identified by functional classes such as

Milita� P�rsonnel and Installations.

Outputs, which were never

measured, were missions such as air defense or sealift.

Until both

inputs and outputs were stated in similar tenns, the DOD could never
make, or even approach, a rational allocation of resources and
unbalanced programs and waste would always result.
The newly appointed Secretary in 1961, Robert S. McNamara,
had read the McKean-Hitch book and was impressed with its logic.
lnert Mogin, "The DOD Programming System Today", ARMED Forces
Comptroller, Vol. 11, No. 1. (January, 1966), p. 13 •. Mr. Mogin is
the Assistant to the Deputy Comptroller for Programming, Office of
the Secretary of Defense.
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His budgetary views coincided with those in the book and Charles

J.

Hitch was appointed the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller.
The similarity of attitudes was described by Mr. Hitch when he said:
The Secretary and I both realized that the financial manage
ment system of the Defense Department 1m.1st serve many purposes.
It must produce a form acceptable to the Congress. It must
account for the funds in the same manner in which they were
appropriated •. It nrust provide the managers at all levels in the
defense establishment the financial information they need to do
their particular jobs in an effective and economical manner •••
Dut we were convinced that the financial management system
must also provide the data needed by top defense manageroont to
make the really crucial decisions, particularly on the major
forces and weapon systems needed to carry out the principal
missions of the defense establishment. And we were well a,tare
that the financial manageroont system, as it had evolved over
the years, could not directly produce the required data in the
form desired. It was clear that a new function, which we call
prograrraning, would have to be incorporated in the financial
management system. l
The words "crucial decisions" in the above quote are the key
to all subsequent financial changes.

Secretary McNamara believed

that only when funds could be missiori appropriated, and accounted
for, could effective decision-making be made at the DOD level.
Funds are the common denominator in all defense efforts and only
through translating all defense efforts to this denominator could
decisions be made and weighed.

Since the crucial decisions had to

be inade by the Secretary of Defense, he must have the necessary tools
to do so.

1
Hitch, Decision-Making for Defense, p. 28.
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The Progranming System
The programming system was proposed in the spring of 1961 and
was developed and installed throughout the DOD during the remainder
of the year.

The new system was used as the basis for the fiscal

year 1963 (FY63) budget submitted t·o Congress in January, 1962.
From its beginning, progranming was established as an administrative
process, to assist in making DOD decisions.

The regular budget,

using the functional appropriation accounts such as Military Con
struction and Procurerrent, was still presented to Congress.

Admin

istration leaders believed the legislators were comfortable with the
old system and would not accept a new format.

Therefore the program

budget was and still is purely an administrative technique.

However,

it has become the principal management mechanism of the DOD •.
The new planning-programming-budgeting structure consists of
five major elements.

They are:

(1) a program structure in terms of

missions, forces and weapon systems; (2) the analytical comparisons
of alternatives; (3) a continually updated five-year force structure
and financial program; (4) related year-round decision-making on new
programs and changes; and (5) progress reporting to test the valid
ity and administration of the plan.

These five features of the

new budget system will be presented as they were chronologically
developed.
The first action was to review thoroughly the Joint Strategic
Objectives Plan (JSOP) t� determine the military requirements for
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the next ten years.
ducted.

An examination of the entire arsenal was con

For example, the question of how many strategic bombers,

combined with how many missiles, were needed to meet all contingen
cies of the plan.

"mix"

In addition the question of the most economical

of weapons was considered and answered.

Each weapon and

possible successors to each were considered in relation to the war
plans.
package.

The entire costs of the weapon systems were computed in one
That is, the cost of a Minuteman would be the total of:

(1) Military Personnel to operate it; (2) Operation and Maintenance
to keep it in an operational status; (3) Procurement costs to
acquire the missile and its spares; (4) Research, Development, Test
and Evaluation to develop the weapon; and (5) Military Construction
to house the missile and its support facilities.

Otherwise, the

traditional budget appropriation accounts were used to compute the
total cost of a weapon system but once that cost was determined, the
individua� accounts lost their separate identities and became simply
the cost of the Minuteman program.

This is the fundamental differ

ence between the two budgetary systems.
maintains accounts by function.

The traditional process

Each function is treated as a sep

arate entity, distinct from all others.

The interrelationship of

functions is not given fiscal recognition.

As basic a proposition

as this may appear, the Defense Department had never accounted for
its expenditures in a manner which would· support the interrelated, or
total program concept.

The Minuteman costs had always been segrega

ted into the traditional cost accounts and a comprehensive price, or
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total package price, had never been detennined.
Once the real cost of a weapon was lmown, cost-effectiveness
studies were made by systems analysts to decide whether to buy more
of an operational system, develop a new system, delete a present
weapon or use part of each alternative to best support the JSOP.
Emphasis should be placed on the point that all cost information was
used to support the joint plan, not to determine its contents. The
JSOP remained the overall statement of defense poli�Y•

The finan

cial data provi�ed a management tool to detennine those parts of the
plan which were feasible within always present resource constraints
and to select possible alternative plans.
The next phase was to group the hundreds of programs and activities of DOD into meaningful program elements. A program element is
"an integrated activity; an identifiable military capability; a
force, support activity, research activity, etc., comprising a com
bination of men, equipment and facilities.01

The program elements are

the basic building blocks of the new budgeting process.

The number

fluctuates each year but there are usually between 800 to

1 ,000

elements. A program element can be one weapon system such as a B-52
or a radar warning system or special types of training and intelli
gence. The one prerequisite is that when the element is in opera
tion it must function independently from other activities to the
degree that it never loses its identity. The delineation is not
nepartment of Defense Directive, DOD Programming System,
Number 7045.1, October 30, 1964, p. 2.
1
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always easy, especially when dealing with minor weapons or organiza
tions whose only input is personnel, where equipment is almost tot
ally absent.
The next task was to relate the program elements to the major
missions of the Defense Department.

The objective_ was to assemble

related groups of program elerrents which should be considered
together because they were close substitutes.

For example the B-47

was substitute for the B-52, the Houd Dog missile s�pported the B-52
mission as part ,of its retaliatory ordnance, therefore all should be
grouped in the same program package.

The unifying principle under

lying each major program is a common mission or set of purposes for
the elements involved.

Originally the nine program packages (the

word "package" has subsequently been dropped) were:
1.

Central War Offensive Forces

2.

Central War Defensive Forces

3.

General Purpose Forces

4.

Sealift and Airlift Forces

5.

Reserve and National Guard Forces

6.

Research and Development

7.

Service-wide Support

8.

Classified Projects

9.

Department.of Defense

Criticism immediately developed about the titles and the
delineation of forces.

The most important criticism of the titles
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concerned the Central War Offensive Forces.

Many argued that this

carried the connotation that the U.S. would act as an aggressor and
start a war.

The title was dropped.

Three others, the last three

listed above, were incorporated into one program because Pentagon
officials believed they did not constitute significant enough areas
to warrant separate identities.

The structure was redesigned and the

new list, which still exists, was initiated.

The new programs (with

brief description) were:
1.

Strategic Retaliatory Forces
The primary mission is to deter military
attacks against the U.S. and its allies.
This force should be powerful enough to
inflict so much damage on any would-be aggres
sor that no nation·would desire to attach the
U.S. or its allies. It is comprised of over
850 ICBM's, over 650 strategic bombers and
over 450 Polaris missiles aboard submarines.
The main systems are the D-52, B-58, B-47,
Minuteman, Titan II and Polaris.

2. · Continental Air and Missile Defense Forces
The basic objective is to provide a force
which will reduce damage from various forms
of attack and make the problem of attacking
the U.S. as difficult as possible. The force
is comprised of interceptor aircraft, surface
to-air missiles, warning and control systems
and the civil defense. The main systems are
the F-lOZ, F-104, F-106, BOMARC, NIKE and the
various radar systems such as the Ballistic
Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS). Also
the shelter program is an element of this
program.
3.

General Purpose:"Forces
The primary mission is to successfully prevail
in large conventional wars and lesser forms of
conflict. It is comprised of almost the entire
Army and Marine Corps, large portions of the
Navy and the tactical Air Force wings.
Weapon systems a.re not as discernable or

14
important in the program element structure of
this force as in the previous two. Organiza
tions such as Marine and Army Divisions,
attack carrier task forces, carrier air
groups and tactical air squadrons are the
basic elerrents.
4.

Airlift and Sealift Forces
The basic mission is to concentrate military
forces rapidly and to sustain them in conflict.
The force is comprised of troopships, cargo
ships, tankers and a large number of cargo
and transport aircraft.

5.

Reserve Forces
The mission is to mobilize and deploy highly
trained units to support already actively
engaged combat troops. Most of the reserve
forces, which are comprised of the separate
service Reserves and National Guards, would
fall into categories 2, 3 and 4, listed above,
in event of their activation.

• 6.

Research and Development
The main mission is to develop for the U.S.
military forces the best possible systems to
curtail aggression and to wage combat when
necessary. It is comprised of a multitude of
programs and systems, most of which are either
not named or classified. Some of the known
examples of R. & D. efforts are the F-111,
the B-70, the anti-missile and infra-red
troop sensing devices. The R. & D. program
supports the entire military program struc
ture except number 8 listed below.

7. General Support
This program is an "all other" or catch-all
category. It includes all of the activities
not readily allocable to mission forces or
weapon systems. Some of its major elements
are training and education, service academies,
intelligence collection, medical services and
department-wide logistics. It is essentially
overhead that is difficult to cost out to
,particular missions.
8. Retired Pay
This is, as the title infers, payments made

\
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to retired military personnel. It is a sep
arate program because it represents costs
beyond administrative control since the terms
and rates of pay of retirement are established
by law.
9.

Military Assistance
The basic mission is to provide our allies with
the best combination of forces to repel aggres
sion and to wage combat. The two elements of
this program are Military Assistance Program
(HAP) which gives aid to foreign nations and
Military Assistance Sales (MAS) which sells
arms to friendly nations. Host of the U.S.
military's older systems filter down into this
program but recently such systems as the F-1O4,
F-5 and tentatively the F-111 have been
included in MAP and MAS.

The major programs, and their aggregate of elements, comprise
the Five-Year Force Structure and Financial Program (FYFS & FP).
This document, the summation of all DOD approved programs, projects
the anticipated costs of each program for five years in the future.
It is the source of all information pertinent to missions, forces
and weapons in the defense establishment.

It contains a total

record of every cost input the DOD makes and, more importantly, it
continuously audits defense spending to insure inputs and outputs
are in balance relative to military objectives and projections.
Each program element, those originally or subsequently
approved personally by the Secretary of Defense, is entered in the
FYFS & FP. Every cost associated with the element is recorded or
projected. This cost is the Total Obligational Authority (TOA) and
represents the total financial requirements of each element for the
next five years.

The cost categories are:
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1.

Research and Development
Those program costs primarily associated with
research and development efforts including the
development of a new or improved capability to
the point where it is ready for operational
use. These costs include equipment costs
funded under the RDT & E appropriations and
costs. They exclude costs which appear in
the Military Personnel, Operation and Mainte
nance and Procurement appropriation.

2.

Investment
Those program costs required beyond the
development phase to introduce into opera
tional use a new capability, to procure ini
tial, additional or replacement equipment for
operational forces or to provide for major
modifications of an existing·capability.
They include Procurement appropriation costs
except those associated with research and
development. They exclude RDT & E, Military
Personnel and Operation and Maintenance
appropriation costs.

3.

Operating
Those program costs necessary to operate and
maintain the capability. These costs include
Military Personnel, Operation and Maintenance
and recurring Procurement approfriation costs
(such as replenishment spares).

Each·program cost is updated on a· monthly basis and must
remain within prescribed limits.

No program can exceed its projec

�tion by DOD prescribed dollar amounts unless the Secretary of
Defense approves additional money to the program.

These limits,

called "thresholds", are basically:
1.

1rbid.-

Research and Development - A $10,000,000
increase limit on any first program year
requirements and a $25,000,000 on the TOA for
five years.
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2. Investment - The same increase limits as ·
R & D plus a $5,000,000 limit on any construc
tion projects.
3. Operating Costs � A $20,000,000 limit on first
year increases and $50,000,000 on total five
year plan.
Anytirre a manager anywhere in DOD believes a "Threshold" is
going to be exceeded he must submit a Program Change Proposal (PCP).
The cost increase can be a result of unforeseen circumstances or a
decision that an enlarged program is necessary to rreet the JSOP
objectives.· The, PCP is sent to the Secretary of Defense in brief
form. If the Secretary believes the proposal warrants further
review a request is made for a detailed proposal to be submitted
within ten days. On these proposals that involve large increases,
or in rare instances large decreases, a cost-effectiveness study is
conducted to assist in the final decision.
Although hundreds of PCP's are annually proposed, only a few
warrant detailed review.

The cost-effectiveness study run on these

is conducted by the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense,
�Systems Analysis. This office, often criticized for permitting the
computers to make decisions, weighs and rreasures the impact of alter
native decisions. Computations are made to determine if program
increases will produce marginal benefits equal to increased costs
and will not decrease another element capability by extracting money
from the other program. The cost-effectiveness studies are compre
hensive efforts to place the limited available financial resources
into those programs which produce the best military posture.

Sorre

of the major decisions that have resulted from these efforts are the
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decision to develop the joint Air Force-Navy F-111, to drop the
Skybolt because its accuracy and penetration ability were too
limited to warrant any additional spending, to delete the Dynasoar
because Gemini performed almost identical missions and not to procure
a presently developed anti-missile missile because its probability
of interception was too low to justify the billions of dollars
required to finance the program.

Probability is the key to the

systems analyst and on his projections, whether it be financial
realism or potential mission capability, a great percent of DOD
decision-making is based.
The final part of F'fFS & FP is the quarterly reporting to
audit whether programs, on which no PCP has been made, are in line
with approved projections.

The quarterly reports are sunnnarized for

the Secretary of Defense in seventy tables.

The tables are broken

into the following categories:
1.

Summary Table - Entire Program

2.

Force Structure by Program

3.

Manpower by Program

4.

Financial Summaries.by Program

5.

Procurement Summaries by Program

6.

Construction Surronaries

7.

Miscellaneous Program Summaries

8.

Appropriation - Program Conversion Tables

9.

Inventory Summaries

10.

Balance of Payments Tables
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The Bureau of the Dudget uses the FYFS & FP to organize DOD
budget requests each year.

The Congress, as mentioned, uses the

traditional accounts to appropriate funds.

Through a special coding

system the two budget systems are intertwined.

For example, the

standard Budget Program Activity Code (BPAC) used by Congress for
missile procurement is Account 57X3O2O.

DOD adds four more digits to

the BPAC which identify the weapon system.
which identify the Titan I are 1O7B.
57X3O2O1O7B.

The four alpha/numerics

The complete �PAC then becomes

Fu:ther, conversion tables can then be used to deter

mine which force structure program contains weapon system 1O7B.
this instance it is the Strategic Retaliatory Forces program).
entire FYFS & FP is computerized.

(In
The

By keying off the BPAC numbers the·

computerized system is capable of producing the program budget or the
functional appropriations budget upon request.

To produce the

appropriation type budget, the machine does not read the final four
digits of the BPAC and arranges a listing by the first seven digits.
To produce the program budget, the ma.chine reads the entire BPAC,
is keyed to put weapon system 1O7B into its proper force structure
and produces a listing in force structure sequence.

The combination

of sw:nmary lists are great as the aforementioned seventy tables
indicate.

Each of those statistical compilations are produced from

the FYFS & FP computer program •. The computerized system requires
only one source of data for both budgets.

This insures that both

will. reveal compatible •financial data since they share a common
source.

Tables I, II, III, and IV portray the Department of Defense
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budgets in both formats.
The functional classification budget is submitted once a year
to Congress.

It is tied to a rigid cycle which begins sixteen

months before any funds are actually received.

Prescribed steps in

the cycle limit the DOD, for all practical purposes, to a one-time re
view each year.

The program budget is free of this cycle.

and is updated on a continuous basis.

It can

The peak, once a year effort

is avoidable and financial planning can be accomplished under less
strained condit�ons.

In effect, changes are made when they are

required rather than being tied to a calendar.

Timely accomplish

ment of objectives is enhanced under this situation.
This is not to imply that the program budget is free of Con
gressional control •. The legislative appropriations are a fiscal
year ceiling in each of the functional accounts.
ment cannot exceed these limits.

The Defense Depart

However, the DOD is permitted to

reprogram within accounts and this is the area where the continuous
updating is accomplished and timely decisions can be effected.
Program Budget Effect
The program budget has changed the decision-making process in
the Department of Defense.

The technique provides infonnation, that

was formerly not available or not compiled, to assist in making
defense decisions.

"Assist" is "'the key to the program system.

In

itself, it makes no decisions but it contains information on which
more logical decisions can be made than was previously possible.
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TABLE I
FISCAL YEAR 1964, 1965, 1966 DEFENSE PROGRAM BUDGETSI:
(DOLLARS IN BILLIONS)

FY64

FY65

FY66

Strategic Retaliatory Forces

7.3

5�3

4.5

Continental Air & Missile Defense Forces

2.1

1.8

1.8

General Purpose Forces

17.7

18,1

19.0

Airlift/Sealift Forces

1.3

1.5

1.6

Reserve and Guard Forces

2.0

2.1

2.0

Research, Development, Test & Evaluation

5.3

5.1

5.4

13.7

14.3

14.6

Military Assistance Program

1.2

1.2

1.3

Retired Pay

1.2

1.4

1.5

TOTAL

51.9

50.9

51.7

PROGRAM

General Support

-1The Budget of the United States Government: Fiscal Year
Ending June 20 1 1967. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington,
D.C., 1966, pp. 70-76. The tables are condensed from much longer
budget lists. The abbreviated format should, in the author's opin
ion, allow the reader to more readily understand the two budgets than
the longer tables which contain several times the data listed above.
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TABLE II
FISCAL YEAR 1964, 1965, 1966 DEFENSE PROGRAM BUDGETS
BY DEPARTMENT AND AGENCY (DOLLARS IN BILLIONS) l

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY

FY64

FY65

FY66

ARMY

12.5

12.0

12.4

NAVY

14.8

14.7

15.3

AIR FORCE

20.3

19.4

18.9

.1

.1

.2

3.0

3.3

3.5

1.2

·l.2

1.3

. 51.9

50.9

51.6

CIVIL DEFENSE
a DEFENSE AGENCIES/ OSD
MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
TOTAL

a This includes the cross-service agencies that support all
defense departments with corrmon equipment and services • . Al so, the
Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) is included in this category
and Retired Pay.
1Ibid.

TABLE III
FISCAL YEAR 1964, 1965, 1966 DEFENSE FUNCTIONAL CLASSIFICATION BUDGETS
(DOILARS IN MILLIONS) 1
. DIRECT BUDGET PLAN (TOA)
FY 1964
FY 1965
FY 1966

FY 1964

12,288
. 695
1.211
14,194

12,720
787
1,399
14,906

12,771
730
1 1529
15,030

12,312
674
i,209
14,195

12,666
774
1 1380
14,820

OPERATION & MAINTENANCE

11,693

12,450

12,472

11,932

12,220

. 12,160

PROCUREMENT

15,831

14,026

13,917

15,351

13,275

13,220

7,137

6,563

6,764

7,021

6,700

6,400

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

988

911

1,357;

1,026

1,000

. 920

FAMILY HOUSING

672

667

748

580

630

660

CIVIL DEFENSE

111

105

194

-

107

125

110

-452

-670

-370·

FUNCTIONAL CLASSIFICATION
}ilLITARY PERSONNEL
A ctive Forces
Re serve Forces
R�tired Pay
Total

RDT & E

REVOLVING & MANAGEMENT FUNDS
TOTAL }ilLITARY FUNCTIONS
}ITLITARY ASSISTANCE c
TOTAL

-

...

EXPENDITURES
FY 1965

FY 1966

.

12,584
706
1,510
14,800

50,625
1 1 237

49,628
1,223

50,481
1,258

49,760
1,485

-48,10.0
1,200

47,900
1 1100

51,862

50,851

51,739

51,245

49,300

49,000

'<:t
N

TABLE III--Cbntinued
FUNCTIONAL CLASSIFICATION
(Millions of dollars)
DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY
ArufY

DIRECT BUDGET PLAN (TOA)
FY 1966
FY 1965
FY 1964
12,465

12,049

12,439

12,050

11,935

11,726

NAVY

14,827

14,720

15,341

14,520

14,107

14,741

AIR FORCE

20,272

19,440

18,882

20,509

18,963

18,235

2,950

3,315

3,625

2,574

2,969

3,088

111

105

194

107

125

110

50,625

49,628

50,481'

49,760

48,100

47,900

1,237

1,223

1,258

1,485

·:,.,200

1,100

51,862

50,851

51,739

51,245

49,300

49,000

DEFENSE AGENCIES/ OSD
CIVIL DEFENSE
TOTAL MILITARY FUNCTIONS
MILITARY ASSISTANCEc
TOTAL

FY 1964

EXPENDITURES
FY 1965

FY 1966

Cconsistent with the FY 1966.Budget Document presentation, Military Assistance orders (reser
vation) placed with the military departments are treated in the same manner as obligations.
1
Ibid.

,
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TABU IV
FISGAL YEAR 1966 DEFENSE FUNCTIUNAL CIASSIFICATION BUDGET BY DEPARTMENT AND AGENCY
(DOLLARS IN MILLIONS) l
..DI.llliCT _BUDGET_PIAN

Defense
Agencies
and
Civil
Defense

Total

Army

Navy

Air
Force

MILITARY PERSONNEL
Active Forces
Reserve Forces
Retired Pay
TUTAL

12,771
. 730
1,529
15,030

4,343
460

_ 3,950
138

4,479
132

4,802

4,088

4,611

1,529
1,529

OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE

12,472

3,672

3,525

4,702

573

PROCU1{EMENT
Aircraft
Missiles
Ships
Ordnance, Vehicles, and Related Equipment
Electronics and Corrrrnunications
Other Procurement
TOTAL

6,367
1,806
1,906
1,980
999
859
13,917

344
254

3,850
1,161

1,024
240
_lli
2,036

2,172
391
1,906
599
417
419
5,905

1,039
992

169
92

200
195

169
705

FUNCTIONAL CLASSIFICATION
�-=--- .

RDT & E
Military Sciences
Aircraft

---

-

-

-

-

355
334
240
5,491

,..
1
7
27
35
500

TABL�-IV--Continued
DIRECT BUDGET PLAN
Total

l:.!]NCTIONAL CLASSIFICATION

Anny

Navy

Air
Force

Missiles
Astronautics
Ships
Ordnance, Vehicles, and Related Equipment
Other Equipment
Programwide Management and Support
Emergency Fund
TOTAL

1,780
1,040
332
364
624
443
150
6,764

-

1,464

-1,473

3,117

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
Active Forces
Reserve Forces
TOTAL

1,314
42
1,357

449
16
465

342
10
351

435
17
452

641
20
2

.184
281
75

'.'194

-

REVOLVING AND MANAGEMENT FUNDS
TOTAL -- Military Functions

50,481

12,439

}ITLITARY ASSISTANCE
TOTAL

12258
51,739

FA}ULY HOUSING

I

CIVIL HOUSING

1Ibid.

748

381
24
330
180
85
76

-

15,341

Defense
Agencies
and·
Civil
Defense

758
995
258
293

-

---

18,882

150
-650
88
88
748
194
3,818
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A high-ranking defense official expressed this fact succinctly when
he said:
Let me assure you that we are under no illusion that our plan
ning prograrruning-budgeting system will in itself make the hard
decisions easy or the complex problems of defense simple.
What this system will do, we hope, is facilitate the rational
analysis of defense problems. It will make tis more aware of
the full cost implications of the choices we· make and will
permit us, more rapidly and with greater accuracy, to cost out
the various alternatives to us. Only in this way can we hope 1·,,
to achieve a maximum military capability from the resources
our governments make available to us.
Military planning has become the basis for defense decisions.
The Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) is the source of all
defense efforts.

The program budget is the instrument which linked

defense activities into a rational sequence of events.

By trans- .

lating missions into dollars, decision-making in all departments is
aimed at accomplishing one set of objectives.

The drawing on the

following page graphically depicts the program budget role as the
link between financial and plans personnel.
The Secretary of Defense, through the program budget is able
to manage his department for the first time.
has been vested in the office since 1958.

The inherent authority

In that year the National

Security Act, which was enacted in 1947 and originally established
the Office of Secretary of Defense, was amended.

The amend.Irent

lAlain c. Enthoven, "Programming and Budgeting in the Depart
ment of Defense", Modern Design for Defense Decisions, ed� ·samuel A.
Tucker (Washington: Industrial College of the Armed Services, 1966),
p. 118. Mr. Enthoven is the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Systems
Analysis. This position was created in 1965. The Systems Analysis
office is responsibte for DOD cost-effectiveness studies.
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Program Budget Cycle

P-LANNING

�(JSOP)�

-Projected Force Structure
�
Cost Effectiveness Studies

·congressional
Review

1

Functional Budget
Categories

\
PROGRAMMING
(FYFS & FP)
FY 1966-70)

BUDGETING
(DOD Budget FY 1966)
· _

.

\

1.

Program Element
Structure

'

Continuously
Updated

Fully Costed
specified that the three military departirents were no longer to be
separately ,admini�trated as they had been in the past.

While the

services maintained separate organizations, the Defense Secretary
. was given the authority to direct and control all military depart
ments.

The one drawback was the Secretary did not have the finan-

cial information to control the large organization and he reacted to
requests as a funds manager.

He fit service requests into infonnal

but rather rigid appropriations guidelines.

Now he participates in

the planning phase plus the financial phase of the department.
.

.

Unbalanced and divergent programs are .less possible when the Office
of Secretary of Defense (OSD) is the single review and audit agency.
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The use of cost-effectiveness studies, or system analysis,
creates alternative courses of action.
presented one plan but many ideas.

The decision-maker is not

Through mathematical models,

simulations and probability studies defense managers are given alter
natives from which to choose.

Obviously the choice of alternatives

does not insure correct decisions but it does provide a more complete
view on which to decide complex issues.
The Five Year Force Structure and Finan�ial-Plan {FYFS & FP)
presents a·long-range plan for the size of a force structure and its
costs.

This assists military managers because a low, first year

cost .is less likely to be bought if the total obligation is projected.
The nrulti-starts, few completions, of development projects has been
curtailed through the total cost concept.

The projected costs also

help planners have a "feel" for the latitude that they have in pro
jecting long-range objectives.

If the next five years are obligated

close to the anticipated budget ceilings, then very few large pro
grams can be realistically integrated into the JSOP.

Low projected

obligations create the opposite situation where large new systems
have a good chance of being developed.
All the relevant information that defense managers need to
make sound decisions is compiled in one place and is available at
any given time.

The computerized system not only produces pre-deci

sion data, it also provides information to control the execution of
a decision.

"Out of control" situations, when a program-exceeds its

"thresholds" for example, are automatically printed on exception
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listings·and top officials are immediately apprised of this status.
The long-range effect of the program budget appears to go
beyond Defense Departirent application.

President Johnson has met

with his Cabinet to "discuss the introduction of a new planning and

.

budgeting system throughout the Government."

1

In this meeting the

department chiefs were told that they would work with the Bureau of
the Budget to define their responsibilities in program terms.

The

fiscal year 1968 and later-year programs were to_be_ identified.
During the spripg and sunnner of 1966 each of the major agencies
attempted to fulfill the President's order.

The results have not

been published but it is obvious that the planning-programming
budgeting technique, at least for the present, will be used through
out the executive branch of the government.
Mr. Hitch, analyzing the first four years of the program
budget, believes

11

it is fair to say that the • • • system is now

well established and is working smoothly. Admittedly, there are
still difficult problems to be surmounted."

One of these problems

is a second budget cycle has started to appear. While many changes
occur to the program budget continuously through the year, the major
decisions get postponed to the last possible moment, which is when

1President Lyndon n. Johnson, "Introduction of New Government
Wide Planning and Budgeting System," 1965� Statement made by the
President to Cabinet Members and Agency Chiefs on August 25, 1965.
2
Hitch, Decision-Making for Defense, p. 63.
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the functional budget review occurs.

So both budgets, involving

double paperwork, reach a peak concurrently and increase an already
intensified effort.

Many of the five year projections (precise

numbers are classified) are simply straight line projections of the
program's first year expenditures.

These unrealistic projections

effect the same "foot-in-the-door" opportunities that previous one
year requests entailed.
The principal weakness of the program budget is that common or
"spillover" services and equipment cannot be directly allocated to
program elements.

The connnon resource, one used by many elements

and across force structure lines, is accounted for by functional
�ppropriations such as Aircraft Spare Parts and Depot Aircraft main
tenance.

Since they cannot be identified with a particular program,

they are arbitrarily allocated to weapon systems and other elements.
By "rough rule of thumb" the common resources are costed to programs,
which costs are in turn projected against the system for five years.
Obviously any cost effectiveness study or attempt to reallocate
resources would be based on potentially false information.

True anal

ysis cannot occur until all costs can be realistically ascertained
against each budget element.
Accurate accounting, both current and projected, is the cor
nerstone of the programming system but it does not presently exist.
The thesis of this paper is that a radica� change in DOD funding
procedures must be made before the program budget can ref�ect actual
costs.

Until such changes are.made defense managers will use
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incomplete and inaccurate data on which to base their decisions.
The proposed funding revision will be aimed primarily at
resolving the accounting problems relative to common support areas.
Other benefits, in the author's opinion, will also be accrued as a
result of the proposals but they will receive a secondary consideration.
The Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) will be the organiza
tion that will serve as the model for both examination and revision
proposal.

The·reason for this choice is that logistics represents

the largest dollar expenditures on common resources.

Most logistics

spending is aggregated in Program VII, General Support.

This

program, which will be retitled Logistics in fiscal year 1969,
represents over twenty-five percent of the entire DOD budget.

This

is a very large percent to be arbitrarily apportioning to the various
force structure programs.

AFLC, and the Army and Navy logistics

organizations, while each operates slightly different, experience
the same problem· of managing common resources.

The author believes

the command offers a valid model to use in developing the paper's
thesis.

In succeeding chapters the examination of AFLC will provide

substance to the author's opinion that. the program budget cannot
be supported within current funding techniques.

CHAPTER II
AIR FORCE LOGISTICS OOMMAND
Air Force Commands
The United States Air Force (USAF) is composed of sixteen major
air corranands.

The command missions fall into three distinct categor

ies. The categories are regional, support, and global.

The breakout

is:
1.

REGIONAL
Continental Air Cornman (CONAC)
Pacific Air Forces (PACAF)
U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE)
U.S. Air Forces Southern Command (USAFSO)
Alaskan Air Command (AAC)
Air Defense Command (ADC)

2.

SUPPORT
Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC)
Air Force Systems Command (AFSC)
Air Training Command (ATC)
Air University (AU)
Headquarters Command (HQS. USAF)
Military Airlift Command (MAC)
Air Force Conununications Service (AFCS)
U.S. Air Force Security Service (USAFSS)

3.

GLOBAL
Strategic Air Corranand (SAC)
Tactical Air Command (TAC)

Those commands with regional or global missions are the strike
or combat forces, the· units which, in the event of an outbreak,
would directly face the enemy in a shooting situation. Each of these
commands has a unique mission which can fit neatly into one of the
33
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following Force Structure Programs:
1.

STRATEGIC RETALIATORY FORCES
Strategic Air Command

2.

CONTINENTAL AIR & MISSILE DEFENSE FORCES
Continental Air Command
Air Defense Command

3.

GENERAL PURPOSES FORCES
Pacific Air Command
U.S. Air Forces in Europe
U.S. Air Force Southern Command
Alaskan Air Command_
Tactical Air Command

The suppont commands cannot be as easily placed in the FYFS &
FP structure since these units service all the air combat organiza
tions.
million.

Of the support commands, three manage funds in excess of $100
They are AFLC, AFSC and MAC.

However, both AFSC and MAC

can distribute their expenditures, to a high degree, to a particular
program element or at least to a major command.
AFSC is responsible for the Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation (RDT & E) efforts of the Air Force.

This includes the

development and initial.acquisition of all new weapons and associ
ated support equipment.

Since the Air Force planners and organiza

tion corrananders levy the requireirents on AFSC, the cost of fulfilling
these mission requireirents can be traced and costed to the proper
program elements.

The F-111 provides a good example of being able

to trace the RDT & E expenditures.

The aircraft is specifically

funded in the budget and is being develo:t?C.d in three basic configur
ations.

The F�lllk is 1 for· TAC· ari.d ·plans::calli for·procuri!}g-. about

1,000; the F-1118 is for the Navy and about 250 are planned to be
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bought; and the B-lll is for SAC and about 250 of these are to be
procured.

The Navy and TAC aircraft support ground forces so they

are costed to General Purpose Forces and all SAC costs are funded out
of the Strategic Retaliatory Forces.

Of course sorre of the ground

support equipment is common to each configuration,. but the amount is
directly related to the number of F-lll's being delivered to each
command.

In other words, a certain number of airplanes require a

given number of units of support equiprrent. · The problem of common
ality is not acute in the RDT & E area.
Military Airlift Corrnnand (MAC), fonnerly titled Military Air
Transport Service (MATS), operates a global airlift system.

It is

the primary air transporter of USAF men and materials around the
world.

The command provides airlift for every Air Force organiza

tion but MAC charges for its services.

Through the industrial fund

ing technique, which will be examined at length later in this paper,
every comma�d_which uses the airlift service must pay for it from
their funds.

Accounts are kept by corrunands and since these commands

generally fit into one force structure program, MAC costs can be
distributed to the proper program categories.
The Air Force Logistics Command is the largest of the support
commands both in terms of personnel and managerrent of funds.

Its

expenditures cannot be, to a high degree, traced to a weapon system
or program element.

Their current managerrent philosophy and funding

techniques prevent an accurate apportionment of costs to program
elements.
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AFLC Mission and Organizations
Logistics appears to be an elusive word to define.

An examina

tion of literature on the subject of military logistics will reveal
that each author has a different definition or set of definitions.
This author believes the following statement best ·describes the
mission of the military logistics organization:

Logistics is getting

the right material, to the right place, in the correct quantity at.
the best time to support the combat forces in gaining their objec
tives.
Each of the military departments has a single corranand to
manage the· logistics function.

Previously, the Army and Navy had

several organizations involved in managing the subdivisions of logis
tics.

During the past five years the efforts of the two services

have been unified under one conunand.

The Air Force has always

managed through one corranand since its inception, in 1947, as a mili
tary department.

The Air �.aterial Corranand (AMC), changed to AFLC in

1961, underwent a decentralization of personnel in 1952 but the
corranand retained complete management of all air logistics support.
The people were moved to the numerous depots and storage sites that
were controlled by AMC.

The number of installations has been reduced

and currently AFLC Headquarters, located at Wright-Patterson Air
Force Base, manages seven field organizations.

AMC controlled the

acquisition of new systems but this responsibility is now assigned to
the Air Force Systems Command�
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The basic mission of the command is that "The Air Force
Logistics Command provides wqrldwide logistics support to the Air
Force.

This includes the procurement, storage and distribution of

supplies and the arrangement for the performance of depot level

maintenance on material."1

This mission statement is reflected in both the organization
of AFLC Headquarters and its field agencies.
Headquarters' organization.

Chart I depicts the

Chart II represents the standard Air

Materiel Area (AMA) organization.

This chart is based on the author's

review of the individual AMA charts.

Each organization that is

common to every AMA is listed on Chart II.

The functions of supply,

maintenance, procurement and transportation can be traced organ
izationally from the command's highest to lowest management levels.
AFLC manages, for the most part, by traditional logistics functions.
However, the Systems Support Manager (SSH) divisions are organized
along weapon system lines.
Logistics objectives and general policy guidance are established
at Air Force Headquarters.

These objectives are in consonance with

the JSOP plans and are corrrnunicated to AFLC through the Deputy Chief
of Staff, Systems and Logistics.
AFLC Headquarters directs its field organizations but does not
generally-participate in actual operations.

Its main functions are

· 1office of the Federal Register, National Archives· and Records
Service, General Services Administration, United States Government
Organization Manual 1966-67 (Washington, D.C., 1966), p. 202.
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to develop procedures and furnish policy guidance to field activi
ties.

The command's main operating units are the Air Material Areas

(AMA), Newark Air Force Station and the 2704th Air Force Aircraft
Storage and Disposition Group.

The AMA's perform the great bulk of

the logistics functions while the other two units have narrow,
specialized workloads.
The size of the command fluctuates but currently the "Author
ized personnel totals around 144,000, with nearly ninety percent
civilians".

The personnel distribution is currently in flux as

ROAMA, MOAMA, SBAMA and MAAMA are being closed.
planned to be completed by 1 July 1969.

The phase-outs are

At that time the command

plans to have five AMA's of between 20,000 and 25,000 each and the
Headquarters will have about 3,000 employees.
The Air Material Areas have the operational responsibilities
for the four basic logistics functions.

The Directorate of Materiel

Hanageirent (D/MM) determines supply requirements and controls their
distribution to Air Force bases.
procured materiel.

The requirements are for centrally

That is, standard items managed at one site and

available to all legitimate users.

This is contrasted with locally

procured materiel which is peculiar to one, or a few users and is
bought from the local economy by the user.

The Directorate of Main

tenance (D/H) accomplishes the depot level repair programs.

The

1Kenneth D. Hobson, United States Air Force News Release, No.
66-250 (Wright-Patterson AFB, 1966), p. 2. General Hobson is the
present AFLC Commander.

41
depot maintenance production schedule is determined jointly by the
D/M and D/MM.

It is based upon supply requirements and the ability

to repair assets in lieu of procuring new equipment.

The Directorate

of Supply and Transportation (DS & T) is responsible for storage of
the centrally procured materiel and for shipping it as D/MM personnel
direct.

The Directorate of Procurement (D/P) buys the equipment that

the D/MM has computed as a requirement.

The directorate functions

revolve around the supply requirements and distribution responsibil
ities of the D/MM.
Supply and distribution function
The AMA Directorates of Materiel Management operate a wholesale
supply system.

The retail customers of the system are the individual

air bases of all the major air conuna.nds.

The task of the supply

system is to provide spares to the bases in order to maintain Air
Force miss�les, aircraft and electronics systems in an operational
status.
Each D/MM has several materiel management divisions and three
administrative divisions.

The three administrative divisions provide

services across· directorate organizational lines.

Such services are

keypunching, local policy determination, cataloging and automatic
data processing.

These divisions are staff offices to the operating

supply divisions.
The materiel management divisions are divided into two cate
gories depending upon the type of materiel being controlled.

One
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type is the Inventory Manager (IM).

The IM manages a group of Feder

al Supply·Classes which require similar technical and supply techniques to determine materiel require100nts and distribution procedures.
The division manages conunodities such·as radio sets, wheels, para
chutes and flight instruments.
a· separate Federal Supply Class.

Each of these corrunodities would be in
For example, radio sets are in

Class 5830, wheels in Class 1650, parachutes in Class 1670 and flight
instruments in Class 6600.

The Di may manage one c�ass or several

classes dependin� upon the number of items and activity in the class.
The Inventory Manager division is the sole source of the equipment it
manages.

This equip100nt is potentially applicable to every weapon or

support system in the Air Force.
the corrunodities.

Every command and every base require

For example, each aircraft has a radio, all ground

power equipment uses a generator and every missile uses a propellant
fuel.
The second type of materiel management division is the System
Support Manager (SSM).
systems.

The SSM is responsible for controlling all

The size of the fleet and the management complexity

involved determines whether an SSM is comprise·d of one or a few
systems.

The B-58 / F-102 SSM is combined because Convair manufac

tured both airplanes and the small number of B-58's in the inventory,
about ninety, does not require a separate division.

The C-5A SSM,

and the F-111 SSM are examples of single system organizations because
of the size of the airc·raft in the case of the C-5A and the size of
the pro:r>osed fleet in the F-111 instance.

Also, as weapon systems age
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they becorre easier to manage and often older systems are combined
into one division.

j ·,

The old cargo planes such as.the C-121, C-119,

C-54 etc. are managed in one division.

Any item or resource con

trolled by an SSM nrust be peculiar to the system(s) the division
manages.

This is the delineation.

No convnodity, however important

it may be to the operation of an aircraft system, is managed by an
SSM if the asset is convnon .to other pieces of equipment.

The Inventory Manager (IM) and System Support Manager (SSM)
perform the same, management tasks.

Their basic tasks are to compute

spares requirerrents and to· insure that proper asset distribution is
made.

The requirements computations fall into three groups depending

upon the characteristics and annual issues of the equipment.

The

three supply groups are:
1.

Replacerrent. This type of equipment never loses its
identity by being placed in a higher assembly. It
retains its identity such as a calibration test stand
or a starter generator. Each.Air Force unit is author
ized a prescribed number of these items; the units have
to account for them and cannot requisition more than
the authorization unless an item is condemned or
returned to a depot for repair. Otherwise, it is a one
for one exchange, or replacement. The requirements
computation, once the initial allocations to the bases
have been built, is based on the reported cond�mnations.
The item manager is allowed to request procurement on
only that number which have to be replaced as a result
of wear-out.

2.

Recoverable. These items are consurred in a higher
assembly such as a radio set becoming a part of an
F-1O2. Once it is installed it no longer is identified
as a radio but as a part of the F-1O2 aircraft. This
type of equiprrent can be repaired either at base, field,
or depot·level•rnaintenance shops. Hence it is not con
demned when it fails but is recovered through mainte
nance actions. The requirerrerits computations are basic-
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ally determined according to the anticipated time
between failure and the time required to repair the
item. The item manager requests procurement quantities
to support the repair pipeline cycle based upon antici
pated failures.
3.

Consumption. These items are generally low cost parts
which are presumed to be consumed upon distribution.
The user does not have to account for the items and
disposes of them at time of replacement. The item
manager bases the computation on a past period's con
sumption. The length of the period depends upon the
price of the item. The cheap items can be bought in
quantities to support a five year requirement, the
expensive items with over $10,000 of annual issues can
be bought in quantities to support a one year require
'ment. This type of computation is the "economic order
quantity" theory which is used in most large businesses.
One thing must be remembered, an issue equals consump
tion and a justification for one additional procurement
quantity.

Through these three basic computational methods, with minor
special adjustments, the total Air Force supply requirements are
determined. All centrally procured stock items are funded out of
three appropriation accounts.

Tables V, VI and VII provide the

details on materiel managerrent procurement in fiscal year 1966.
(One fact again is emphasized; AFLC does not procure new aircraft or
missiles and the totals in the tables do not reflect initial acquisi
tion expenditures.)

Besides depicting the size of AFLC annual pro

curement, the tables graphically show that no program element or
weapon system identification is made. Each budget program represents
a functional category; no category represents a breakout analogous to
the program budget delineations. Whereas the program budget might be
stated in terms of B-52 or Minuteman accounts, the functional budget
structure represents such widespread areas as Replenishrrent Spares
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and Electronic and Tele-Communications Equiprrent.

This type of

expenditure is related to every program element under Air Force
management.
AFLC manages

1 , 1 35,

IM/SSM divisions.
150,700

430 separate line items through the

Approximately 70,700 are repla�en�nt items,

are recoverable and 904,800 are conswnption type items. The

total inventory value is $20.5 billion.
The second function of the IM/SSM division is to control the
distribution o� its items.
in a timely manner.

The basic task is to fill a requisition

The primary objective is to insure that no

firstline or expensive pieces of equipment are nonoperational as a
result of asset nonavailability.
sheer magnitude of the operation.

This is a complex task due to the
The size of the distribution func

tion can be visualized-by the fact that "Annually the IM/SSM process
nearly 16,000,000 requisitions."1
The distribution system effectiveness is dependent upon the
supply requirements determinations. When an item manager computes
correct buy levels, assets can be delivered as requested; 'When
requirerrents are incorrectly determined the distribution efforts
faiL
Maintenance engineering function
AFLC maintenance activities, personnel-wise, are the la.rgest

1Hobson, News Release, No. 66-250, P• 2.
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TABLE V
AIRCRAFT PROCUREHENT1 APPROPRIATION ACCOUNT 57 X 3010, BI
TYPE OF PROGRAM FOR FI:>CAL
YEAR 1966 (DOLURS IN MILLIONS)

PROGRAM
11 - Modifications
12 - In-Service Direct Ground Support
Equipment - Common

EXPENDITURES
601.8
86.4

15 - Replenishment Spares and Repair Parts

877.5

16 - Initial Spares

267.6

17 - War Consumables

46.7

18 - Procurement Other Than Air Force

93.0.

19 - Other Charges

43.9

TOTAL

2,016.9

1Air Force Logistics Command, AFLC Financial Surrrnary (Wright
Patterson AFB, 1966), pp. 3-6.
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TABLE VI
HISSILE PROCUREMENT, APPROPRIATION ACCOUNT 57 X 3020, DY
TYPE OF PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1966 (DOLLARS IN MILLIONS) l

PROGRAH
20 - Weapon System Procurement
21 - Modifications
22 - Replacement Equipment and Automatic
Te st Equipment

EXPENDITURES
2.1

ss.s
4.7

25 - Replenishment Spares and Repair Parts

·37.4·

26 - Initial Spares and Repair Parts

15.3

27 - Special Projects

41.4

28 - Procurement Other Than Air Force
29 - Other Charges

.5
74.9
231.8

TOTAL

1Ibid., pp. 3, 14.
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TABLE VII
OTHER PROCUREHENT, APPROPRIATION ACCOUNT 57 X 3080, RY l
TYPE OF PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1966 (DOLLARS IN MILLIONS)

PROGRAM
81 - Munitions and Associated Equipment

EXPENDITURES
1,073.3_

82

Vehicular Equipment

162.0

84

Electronic and Tele-Communications
Equipment

192.4

85 - Other Base Maintenance and Supply
Equipment

243.3

87 - Procurement Other Than Air Force

21.8

88 - Equipment Modifications

41.2

TOTAL

1,734.0

in the command. Approximately forty-two percent of the employees
work in this area.

Maintenance efforts begin with the initial pro

visioning stages of a new weapon system or piece of equipment. They
end with the final disposition of the property when it becomes excess
to Air Force requirements.
The separate maintenance functions are provisioning, reliabil
ity;and maintainability, tec�ical public�tions, modifications and
lrbid., pp. 3, 20.
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depot level repair.

The first four functions can be described as

technical tasks and the last as a production role.

In the Air

Materiel Area organization, all but depot level repair is perforrred
by Directorate of Materiel Management (D/MM) personnel.

It is

accomplished by Directorate of Maintenance employees.
Provisioning is accomplished early in the production of a new
system before the design is fully defined or stabilized.

The manu

facturer provides drawings and specifications on ev�ry component in
the system.

The,AFLC technician nrust then determine whether each

component should be bought and whether it can be repaired when
removed from the complete piece of equipment.
Reliability and maintainability engineering is a continuous
process.

Every piece of equipment is coded and all failures and

maintenance manhours spent on its repair are recorded.

If a piece

of equipment fails more often than anticipated (low reliability) or
consumes more repair manhours than projected (low maintainability),
a technician will initiate action to rectify the situation.
A host of possible solutions exist; they range from a repair
manual clarification to major redesign or modification of the weapon
system.

Modifications are constantly occurring in attempts to

improve effectiveness, safety and mission capability.

Examples of

each are:
1.

Effectiveness. The coolant gas in heat seeking air
to-missiles was changed. The new gas is cooler thus
making it more sensit.ive to heat. The in�reased
sensitivity allows it to home in quicker so· enemy
aircraft have less time to go into diversionary
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tactics. The result is 100% increased effectiveness
in shooting down enemy aircraft.
2.

Safety. The A-lE Crusader had no automatic pilot
ejection capability. In order to abandon the airplane
the pilot had to manually pull back the sliding cock
pit door and jump e Experience revealed that in a
steep dive the pilot could not open the door. The
modified pilot seat has an ejection mechanism which
can be activated by the flyer's touch. Pilot safety
was increased.

3.

Mission Capability. A B-52D,G aircraft could carry
twenty-seven 750-pound bombs. By adding wing pylons
and changing internal bomb racks, the planes now
carry fifty-one bombs which doubles the fonrer :' ··
d�structive capability.

Most of the major modifications are accomplished in the AFLC
depots or civilian contractor sites.
the individual bases.

The minor changes are done at

However, AFLC i� responsible for designing,

approving and funding all modifications.

Necessary material and

technical guidance is provided by AFLC and accounts relative to mod
ification accomplishment are kept by the command.

Tables V, VI and

VII show the cost of parts required in the modification of Air Force
equipment.
All Maintenance technical publications are written by AFLC per
sonnel.

The manuals provide instructions ranging from the pilot

handbook and pre-flight visual inspection to entire teardown and
overhaul of an aircraft.

Any form of maintenance, calibration or

repair is specifically described in the technical publications.
Every change to these books requires corronand approval.
The largest AFLC ·maintenance responsibility, in term� of money
and people, is the depot level repair program.

The Air Force

'. ·
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recognizes three levels of maintenance; the levels are organizational,
field and depot.

The assignment is determined "principally by the

investment in special tools, equipment and facilities and by the
level of skills required to do the task.

In general, the first two

levels are a responsibility of the using ·corranands TAC, SAC, ADC, etc.
while depot level maintenance is the responsibility of the Air Force
Logistics Corranand."1 While AFLC supports the maintenance technical
efforts of the entire Air Force, it only actually repairs those
items coded for depot repair�

As indicated in the quotation, depot

level items are the compiex pieces-of equipirent requiring extensive
support items, facilities and skill levels.
The depot level maintenance program is divided into organic
and contractual portions.

The organic is performed by AFLC depots

and the contractual is accomplished by private business.
assignment is determined by Air Force policy.

The work

It dictates that

mission-ess�ntial, first-line, weapon systems will be done organi
cally and remaining workloads will be accomplished contractually.
This policy exists only in theory because many first-line systems
are contractually maintained and modified.

The real effect of the.

policy is that organic shops do not maintain anything less than
mission-essential systems.

The B-52 is repaired by both contractor

and AFLC depot, for example, but all C-119 aircraft, an old cargo
plane of the Korean War period, are contractually maintained.
1Air Force Logistics Connnand, Maintenance Engineering 1966
(Wright-Patterson AFB, 1966), p. 1.
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The workload is evenly divided between the organic and con
tractual facilities.

Approximately fifty percent is accomplished by

each, private business·and Air Force depots.

The total cost is

almost $1.4 billion with $900 million spent on contract repair and
$500 million funded for government repair sites.

The disparity in

costs for approximately equal workloads is caused by the fact that
the Directorate of Materiel Management:functions are not charged to
organic production.

Only labor, local purchase and.utilities are

·costed to organic production.

The technical aspects and centrally

procured.spares are not charged to organic repair.

These overhead

and material costs are charged to depot repair f�nds when a con
tractor performs the work.

Obviously, the contractor must be paid

for his entire effort.
The depot maintenance program is funded out of Appropriation
57 X 3400, Operation and Maintenance (0 & M).

The fiscal year 1966

breakout b� manµours and personnel equivalents is contained in
Table VIII.

This table shows, as in the procurerrent budget accounts,

that program elements are not defined.

Functional accounts are

maintained and subsequent program relationships are difficult to
establish.
Storage and transportation
The AMA Directorate of Supply and Tra
_ nsportation (DS&T) is
responsible for storing all centrally procured items.

The. storage

site for parts is generally at the AMA which manages the assets.
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TABLE VIII
DEPOT LEVEL MAINTENANCE PROGRAM MANHOUR AND PERSONNEL
REQUIREMENTS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1966 DY
COMMODITY/WEAPON SYSTEM CATEGORIESl

Commodity/System

Hanhours

Personnel

.1

Aircraft

Depot
19,642,437
Contract 29,857,170
Total
49,499,�07

.2

Engines

Depot
Contract
Total

4,963,359
4,531,570
9,494,929

3,467
3,165
6,632

.3

Acees sories

Depot
13,495,340
Contract 8,894,384
Total
22,389,724

9,072
S,981
15,053

.4

Corranunication.s & Electronics

.s

Depot
Contract
Total

2,690,875
2,463,014
5,153,889

1,850
1,696
3,546

Ground Powered Equipment

Depot
Contract
Total

1,525,908
2,378,643
3,904,551

1,004
1,570
2,574

.6

Other Equipment

Depot
Contract
Total

3,697,051
1,827,325
5,524,377

2,474
1,225
3,699

Depot
Contract
Total

644,892

483

644,892

483

Depot
Contract
Total

7,131
7,131

s
s

Depot
Contract
Total

3,037,601
2,391,017
5,428,618

2,124
1,672
3,796

• 7. A/f, Storage

.8
.12

Other Storage
Missiles

AFLC Maintenance Engineering, Long Range Workload and
Resources Plan (Wright Patterson AFB, 1966), pp. 23-26.

13,259
20,154
33,413
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TABLE VIII - Continued

Sununary

Depot
49,704,594
Contract 52,343,124
102,047,718
Total

33,738
35,463
69,201

DS&T notifies the item manager of receipts from manufacturers and of
shipments to using bases.

These transactions a,re reported to com

puters which automatically update the IM/SSM account books and keep
them current.

DS&T performs periodic and special inventories to

check the accuracy of the stock accounts and to assist in inventory
adjustments.

The outbound mode of transportation is generally

determined by this directorate although in special cases the item
manager will intercede to expedite a shipment.
Procurerrent function
The Directorate of Procurement (DP) performs the buying task.
The IM/SSM divisions send purchase requests, based on their computa
tions,
to DP.
'
'

The directorate is charged to buy the items listed on

the requests.

DP is told how many to procure, - but they determine the

contractor and the price of the required articles.

In addition, the

directorate decides on inbound modes of transportation and types of
contract and also conducts price analysis studies.

55
Stock Funds and Industrial Funds
A stock fund is a revolving fund where the supplier, AFLC,
charges the purchaser, major air coJJJnand, for the items that are
consumed.

In essence, a buyer-seller relationship is developed

through stock funding as the consumer's funds are used to buy goods
from the supplier.

When a stock fund is set up, all the inventories

of supplies and equipment in the categories to be covered by the
funds are given a dollar valuation, or are capitalized. Additional
cash for working capital is provided. The managers of the fund buy
stocks with their working capital according to estimates of future
needs.

As these are sold to the customers, inventories are con

verted into cash which can be used to buy new supplies. One fact
should be emphasized.

Revolving funds are a direct contrast to the

standard AFLC operation involving centrally procured assets. Pay
ment is required for every part issued.

This fact is stressed in

the Departmmt of Defense Supply Managemrnt Reference Book.

"The

buyer-seller relation in the revolving fund concept is designed to
achieve •••[thi} elimination of "free issue" of supplies since
using activities purchase stock fund items with allocated funds."

1

An industrial fund is a revolving fund established to provide.
working capital for the operation of comirercial-type or industrial
type installations.

These .activities manufacture goods for or

lnepartment of Defense, Supply Manageirent Reference ·Book, DA
Pamphlet No. 700-1 (Washington, n.c., .1965), p. 125.
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furnish service to DOD consumers.

It is basicall y the same as the

stock fund except it deals in production or services rather than
supplies.

The simi larity and difference are c lear ly defined in the

following comment:
Initially, each industrial fund is constituted of cash; accounts
receivable; inventories of materials, supplies and work in
process; and all other current assets except land, plant and
equipment of the activity. The fund is used to finance the
costs of goods produced or services rendered, being reimbursed
for these·goods or services from the appropriated funds avai l
able to the customer (consumer) who has ordered, and received,
these goods or services. l
AFLC has four stock funds and three industrial funds. Each has
the same objective; it is to break even at the end of every fiscal
year.

The sa le of goods, services or production should equal the

cost of "making" the various outputs. Tab le IX lists the separate
funds and fiscal year 1965 performance. The table contains figures
which show that the special fund managers, for all intents and
purposes, _achieved their goal of equality between expenses and sales.
The distinction between stock/industrial funds and centra lly
procured/depot repair programs, genera lly used in AF1.C, is that the
specia l funds direct ly charge the consumer. The customer is respon
sible for funding the resources.

On the other hand, the regular

supply and maintenance operations are funded by AFLC and the consumer
receives the goods or services free of charge. AFLC has to justify
procurement costs as well as consumption rates in order to be funded
each year.
1Ibid.,

PP• 129-130.
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TABLE IX
AIR FORCE STOCK AND INDUSTRIAL FUNDS COSTS AND SALES FOR
FISCAL YEAR 1965 (DOLLARS IN THOUSANDS)l

STOCK FUNDS
..

Aviation Fuels
Sustinence - Corranissary
Clothing
Academy Cadet Store
TOTAL
Net G ain

COSTS

SALESa
(APPROXIHATE)

699,275
613,746
38,275
1,728

678,000
620,000
46,000
2,000.

1,343,298

1,345,831

2,533

COSTS

SALES

Printing - Duplicating
Laundry - Drycleaning
Milit,a,:,y Airlift

10,531
7,292
446,690

10,539
7,335
445,682

TOTAL (Adjusted)

460,622

463,556

INDUSTRIAL FUNDS

Net Gain

2,934

.,

a The

sales were not listed in a detailed bre akout but were
rounded off to the ne arest million dollar. However, the total figure
is exact to the nearest thousand dollar.
lu.s. Government Printing Office, The Budget of the -United
States Government: Fisc al Ye ar Endin une 30 1967, (Washington J
n.c., 1966 , PP• 337-339.
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AFLC Sununary
The corranand manages $8.2 billion dollars annually.

Approxi

mately $4 billion is spent on procurement and $1.4 billion on depot
level maintenance.

The total dollars managed represents ·about forty

percent of the total Air Force budget and the procurement and main
tenance expenditures amount to approximately twenty-seven percent of
Air Force funds.
The corranand headquarters and the field instaliations are organized along functional lines.

The traditional logistics tasks of

supply, transportation, maintenance and procurement each have
separate directorates.

Little attention, organizationally, 'is given

to total programs or weapon systems.

The System Support Manager

divisions are the only examples where systems are recognized through
the organization structure.
AFLC manages resources which are used to support the missions
of each major air conmand�

In effect, logistics efforts are

expended on every Air Force program eleirent, except retired pay and
research and development eleroonts, contained in the major programs of
the Five Year Force Structure and Financial Plan.

CHAPTER III
RESTRICTIONS TO PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

The Air Force Logistics Command cannot provide factual cost
data to the program budget because the connnand seldom computes
requirerrents by programs or accounts for expenditures by program. A
large percent of AFLC funds are spent on common materiel and services
which, due to present appropriation methods, cannot be realistically
costed to the appropriate element conswrer.
The "spillover" or common resources are in the Procurement and
Operation and Maintenance (0 & M) areas.
are listed on Tables V, VI and VII.

The procurement accounts

The total O & M account, 57 X

3400, was funded for$2.0 billion in fiscal year 1966, of which$1.4.
billion was funded to perform depot maintenance.

Some of the depot

maintenance money plus large portions of the procurement funds are
expended on items that are considerably smaller than weapon systems
and on items which are a part of more than one program element.
The materiel area, on which the 57 X 3010, 3020 and 3080 funds
are spent, is divided into three types of items.
ment, recoverable and consumption type spares.
tions check pages 41 and 42.)
spent to buy parts.

They are replace
(For detailed defini

Approximately$4.0 billion are annually

This figure represents the total amount of Tables

V, VI and VII. Approximately$ .4.billion is spent on replacement
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spares, $2.8 billion on recoverable spares and$ .8 billion on con
sumption parts.

The recoverable and replacement items are sixty

percent peculiar to one basic aircraft and forty percent conunon to
many weapon systems.

The consumption items are �venly divided between

.
pecu1.1ar and common items. 1
A peculiar· item is one which is only a part of one basic air
frame.

It may be on several series of one aircraft, such as the

B-52B, C and D configurations, but the airframe will always be, in
this example, �he B-52.

The peculiar parts are identified by adding

a two digit suffix code to the regular eleven digit Federal Stock
Number.

Generally, peculiar item costs are easily costed to a program

element since most weapon systems are individual elements or the
major portion of a program elerent.

Some cases exist where an air

craft is part of more than one major program; the KC-135 is costed to
Strategic Retaliatory Forces when it is used to refuel a long-range
bomber and General Support Forces when it aerially refuels a tactical
fighter.

However, they are rare and are a small percent of the total

Air Force Flying program.

The "spillover" in the peculiar item area

1The figures in this paragraph �re researched by the author
and Hr. Raymond Kristy, AFLC Supply Analyst. They represent dollar
values and percentages. The figures were compiled from the Air
Materiel Area reports titled Requirements Inventory Analysis Reports
(RIAR). The research was accomplished as a result of DOD requesting
that common items be _identified to weapon systems when determining
FY 67 requirerents. At that time, Mr. Kristy determined that it was
not possible under present appropriation procedures and asset distri
bution methods. AFLC has continued to identify only peculiar item
costs to weapon systems. It was this study which led the author to
seek a method whereby total program costs could be accurately com
puted.
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does not create a large problem.

The procurement categories,

reflected on Tables V, VI and VII, that involve only peculiar assets
are the Initial Spares, Modifications and Special Project Categories.
Of course, each of the other budget programs include peculiar parts
but the point is that only a few procurement categories, accounting
for less than 30 percent of the total expenditures, can be analyzed
to ascertain the program which consumes the resources.
Common items, in contrast to peculiar ones, are used on at
least two differ�nt airfraires.

In many cases, flight instruments,

for example, the common parts are a part of every aircraft in the
Air Force.

The problem of identifying these items to a program ele

ment has never been resolved.

Arbitrary methods have been suggested

such as prorating each of these parts against the flying hours of
every aircraft on which they are consumed.

For example, if the item

is used on five aircraft and each has an identical total number of
annual flying hours, then the procurement costs would be evenly
divided between the five aircraft.

However, the Departrrent of Defense

has not accepted this rrethod because the reliability and maintainabil
ity figures of the same spare part varies for each aircraft applica
tion.

Replaceirents and condemnations are not solely related to the

number of flying hours but upon many other factors such as placerrent,
vibrations, speed, weight, etc.

Conunon items are refle�ted, with the

exception of those categories listed above,_ in all the budget programs
depicted on Tables V, VI and VII.

The extent, in terms of �ollars, is

widespread and an analyst searching for program element relationship
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cannot establish it through the appropriations system.

The budget

categories simply <lo not serve as a �ide,, in most instances, to deter
mine where the resources are being consumed.

The point, although

reiterated many times, should be made that functional budget accounts
cannot support the program element structure because the two systems
make different money identifications.
The expenditures on common items annually amount to approxi
mately $1.7 billion or 8.5% of the total Air Force budget.

These

figures do not include the administrative costs incident to the
computation and procurement of the parts nor to the transportation
and storage costs involved in the distribution of assets. Most of
the funds to support these activities are in the Operations and
Maintenance account 57 X 3400.

The major O & M categories are per�o

sonnel services, travel, transportation, supplies, equipment and
maintenance.
The O & M costs are the most difficult to identify and appor
tion to program elements. Many defense officials, including Mr.
Hitch, have voiced concern over this fact:
There is • • • the unsatisfactory state of operating costs in
many areas. Our appropriation·accounting systems do not
directly yield operating costs by program element - e.g., by
aircraft type. Many of the alleged "actual" operating costs
of elements in the Five-Year Program are obtained by an allo
cation of budget categories. Since these "actuals" constitute
the base for projecting future operating costs, some parts of
the financial program are not too meaningful. For example we
do not really know whether the • • • present cost projections
·accurately reflect the growing operation and maintenance
requirements of its expanding fleet of aircraft. Improvements
in the Department's cost estimating system in the operation
and maintenance area must definetly be placed high on our
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future agenda.1,
Robert N.·Anthony, the present DOD Comptroller, shares his
predecessor's opinion concerning O & M costing methods:
When someone is asked to authorize money for an operating
activity, the natural question he asks is: what do you propose
to do, and how much is it going to cost? We .can't match costs
against the work to be done today since the present budget
structure is slanted towards inputs - - military personnel,
fuel, TDY, and the like; it does not provide a matching of
inputs with outputs. We therefore can't give a good answer to
the question I have stated, and without such an answer, it is
difficult to make� convincing case as to why.we really need
the money we seek.
As with the centrally procured materiel items, there are some
costs which can easily be identified to a program element.

Personnel

in a Systems Support Manager division total aircraft depot overhaul
and contractor furnished trasportation of peculiar items can be
apportioned to the particular weapon system involved.
costs are again common or shared.

However, many

Conununication systems, warehousing,

medical support, utilities and portions of depot maintenance cannot
be neatly separated into program elements.

These services receive an

aggregate appropriation and are measured against the aggregate total
rather than weapon systems.
The depot.maintenance program is the most significant portion,
in dollar terms, of the O & M account.

Of the $1.4 billion annually

lcharles J. Hitch, Decision-Making for Defense (Berkeley and
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965), p. 65.

2 Robert N. Anthony, "The What and Why of Defense Management,"
Address before the Defense Management Systems Course, Naval Post-
graduate School, Monterey, California, August S, 1966.
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expended, approximately thirty percent of the funds are spent on
common services.

This$420 million added to the common materiel

costs of $1.7 billion amounts to over $2.1 billion in expenditures
that cannot be accurately costed to a program element.

The thirty

percent represents material and labor costs consumed in the repair

of common engines, accessories, electronics and g�und equipment.1
The thirty percent figure is based upon whether the item being

repaired is managed by a System Support Manager (Ss};) or an Inventory
Manager (IM).

If an IM manages an end item and determines its repair

schedule, it is considered conmon and conversely if an SSM controls
the asset, it is peculiar.
To determine the breakout in the remaining$ .6 billion of
0 & M funds is not easy. The personnel alignments in procurement,
supply and storage, etc., are not neatly arranged around a commodity
or an end item.

As shown in Charts I and II, the. support director

ates are organized along functional lines and not according to
programs.

The warehouse space is not costed and the only values

carried on the books are the original construction plus any addi
tional construction costs. While the inventory of peculiar and
corranon items is known both in dollar and line item totals, the
1AFLC Haintenance Engineering, Long Range Workload and
Resources Plan (Wright-Patterson AFB, 1966), pp. 5-301. The author
researched the entire publication to separate the common and peculiar
costs. The surrmarized totals appear in Table VIII. It is believed
a system by system, subsystem by subsystem breakout is not required
because such a listing, plus an additional identification the author
had to make concerning peculiar and common workloads, would be too
voluminous to use •
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weight and cube needed to apportion storage and transportation costs
could not be determined.

Also, modes of transportation varied upon

the priority of the requisition and while the number of such shipments
could be found, it was not possible to ascertain the characteristics
of the shipped items.

Decause of these unresolved contingencies, the

author resisted the temptation to prorate the costs and is not includ
ing such arbitrary costs in presenting his thesis.

Nevertheless it

is accurate to say that portions of these support e�penditures are
in the common a�as.
Assigning common item costs to a program element is only half
of the problem.
occurs.

The other half is determining where consumption

Have the resources been expended on the intended program

elements? Without an audit mechanism, there can be no real measure
ment as to the validity of planned resource usage.

The projected

costs remain an initial plan but do not become a year-end standard
against which to measure _expenditures because total spending is
unknown.

As an example from the author's experience, the F-5 is a

Mutual Assistance Program (MAP) weapon and is thus totally funded from
and costed to Program 9, Military Assistance.

The aircraft is a

modified T--38, which is the basic jet trainer in the Air Force.
F-5 and T--38 have approximately fifty percent common parts.

The

The

first two production contracts called for 200 F-5's and a full range
of initial and replenishrrent spare parts.

The parts were delivered

concurrently with the aircraft, but since the replenishment parts
were not immediately consumed, they were placed in storage sites.
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The T--38, with an inventory approaching 1,000 aircraft, had a large
flying hour program and required extensive spares support.

Si.nee the

parts were available, and the T--38 had valid requirerrents while the
F-5 was barely being flown, the SSM filled all possible requisitions
with the F-5 spares. This was obviously unplanned consumption and
would never be recorded properly.

While this example may be unusual,

it points out the fact that no one can truly account for the consump
tion of connnon items or services.
AFLC has l�ttle control over the distribution or consumption of
common resources. Any authorized base can requisition, in almost any
amount, the connnon parts.

It is normally a "first come - first

served"

basis. The command is expected to justify consumption in their
requirements computations based upon reliability figures. A computed ·number of items is bought to support each aircraft· on which the
part is used.· Theoretically consumption is known and costs can be
apportioned to the various airplanes or program elements. In reality
consum:ption does not result from reliability figures but solely from
the number of items the separate air bases requisition. ·These parts
are requisitioned by base supply organizations that support the entire
base aircraft inventory. The inventory can include any number of
different types and models. Even when the computed amounts are correct
and are used for·planning purposes, there is no assurance that con�
sumption occurred in the planned manner and therefore projected cos.ts
lThe author was a Logistician in the T-38/F-S SSH for eight
months.
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are not synonymous to real costs.

Unless actual consumption is

recorded, planned resource usage cannot be 1reasured against actual
usage.
Functional thinking, as a result of managing common resources
and services, permeates AFLC Headquarters management philosophy.

This

thinking further aggravates the problem because the operating agencies
are generally given goals that reflect separate actions rather than
programs or systems.

The Air Materiel Areas (AHA). are rated by the

number of back9rders, timeliness of publication, procurement adminis-.
trative time and the like.

See Chart III for AFLC Do-List Objectives.

The activity criterion can reveal misleading information and certainly
detracts from a program management philosophy.

The following statement

supports this belief:
A further pursuit of this line of reasoning leads us to reexam
ine some of our criteria of goodness. For example, we have each
seen �eports of studies where different stockage policies for
fixed dollar inventories have been compared solely on the basis
of fill-rates. Now if each of the stockage policies being com
pared had incorporated all the necessary constraints as integral
to the policy, then the resulting comparison should have valid
meaning. The �anger, if there be one, results if one uses a
criterion such as fill-rate outside its proper context. For
example, without adequate practical constraints such as strati
fication by essentiality if such be indicated·, the maximization
of fill-rate within a fixed dollar constraint can in an inade
quately delineated policy, lead to the conclusion that the
available dollars should be spent for more protection in the low
cost items with few or no expensive but critical items being
ordered. The rejoinder one may well receive to this statement
is: Well, of course, it is expected you will use common sense
in the· application of the model, and I agree, one should. How
ever, if one is utilizing products f.rom an automated data system,
he had better make sure that some of this "common senie" is
incorporated into the articulation of these products.
1Dr. Landis

s.

Gephart, "Potential Problems in �asuring and
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CHART III

AFLC OBJECTIVES FOR 1966 2

1.

Publish the policies of AFLC in one volume.

2.

Accomplish 100% stockage at all bases for J-57/J-75
engines.

3.

Develop a standard routing guide for movements to
overseas destinations.

4. · Provide 30 mechanized materials handling systems
for SEA.
5.

Convert contractor technical services manpower to
competitive status.

6.

Develop and apply clerical standard time data.

7.

Maintain minimum number of active inventory items.

8.

Improve manpower management techniques in D/MM and
D/S & T functions.

9.

Plan for procurement inspection of petroleum/oil/
lubricants (POL) in limited war areas.

10.

Emphasize the use of cost effectiveness models.

11 •. Design optimum cataloging system.
12 .

Implement USAF equipment data bank.

Evaluating Logistics Activities," Logistics Research Conference
(2 Vols., Washington: Department of Defense, 1965), Volwre II,
No. 8, pp. 26, 2 7.
2

Air Force Logistics Command, "AFLC Do-List Objectiv.es,"
AFLC Management Systems I AFLCH 171-5 (Wright-Patterson AFB, 1966),
pp. 15-19.
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Most of the objectives are not stated in mission terms and the AMA's
are, in essence, compelled to concentrate their management efforts in
areas less than program element size.
These criticisms are not meant to conclude that AFLC is not
concerned with program management.

The command has long recognized

its value and has been a forerunner in advocating its establishment.
Advocation and accomplishment are, needless to say, separate activi
ties and it is in the accomplishment area that AFLC_has had limited
success.

The SSM concept was the beginning of program management

and in 1959 the Logistic Programs Management System (LPHS) was ini
tiated by AFLC.

This system, which preceded Secretary McNamara's

new budget methodology, encompassed the basic philosophy and objec
tives of the DOD planning-programming-budgeting procedures.
The system has had many titles and operational revisions since
its inception but the objective of coll ecting cost data by programs
has remained constant.

The primary purpose of the system is briefly

summarized in the following staterrent:
The basic premise underlying LPMS is that a significantly large
portion of the workload of an Air Materiel Area (AMA) can be
determined by reference to Air Force Programs (or interpreta
tion of these programs through such processes as requirements
computations), and that it is possible to relate the required
resources (manpower, ma.terial, equipment and facilities) to
these expressions of workload. As a step by step process, Air
Force Programs are converted to AMA Programs; AMA Programs are
converted into workload projections by organizations, resources
are allocated back against AHA Programs, and the consumption
of resources is related to workload accomplishment. The pro
gram orientation of this concept is in line with the greater
emphasis being placed on system program management in terms of
identifying capability and costs to system programs. l
lAFLC Mission Statement, Air Force Logistics Command, Logistic
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In essence, LPMS attempts to match the workload accomplished to the
resources consumed in a weapon system arrangement. For peculiar
workloads such as the D-52 overhaul shop the LPMS system works very
well.

Again it is the common item and support areas where the system

breaks down.
The first three phases of the LPMS have been installed at the
AH.A's. A cursory glance at these phases reveals that certain costs
cannot be identified to a weapon system or program �lement.

The

following quote 9oncedes this point:
The first phase identifies the kind of responsibilities charged
to an AHA Commander and lists them in quantitative expressions
of systems, commodity groupings, or support. The second phase
coverts the foregoing logistic program into personnel equiva
lents by kinds of work by organization to division level. The
third phase converts the foregoing personnel equivalents into
the required manpower spaces ••• The remaining phases of
LPMS are being developed. They ,will provide for the inclusion
of the additional resources required to support the above
logistics programs; i.e., supplies, e�uipment, real property,
and funds for travel, transportation.
The LPMS cannot compute total costs because commodity (common mate
rial) and support (management and administrative) are recognized as
separate entities and not as integral parts of larger elements. They
are accorded the same status as a weapon system. That is, costs are
accrued to them as if they were a B-52 or a Minuteman.· Commodity
and support are termed.programs in the LPMS but under the DOD con
cept this is not the case. While the objective of LPMS was to

Programs Management System (Wright-Patterson AFB, 1966), pp. 1, 2.
2Ibid., p. 2.
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compute total system costs, it does not in areas of conunon usage
because no accurate accounting method has been discovered.

The orig

inal belief was that these areas could be apportioned to the actual
consumer systems but now it is conceded as impossible. It was also
formerly thought, by those who manage the system, that LMSM "Supports

DOD objective of program management control (Hitch concept)".1

However, "program" has a different rreaning under each management sys
tem and therefore they are not compatible.2

The examination of LPMS is n9t intended as a criticism of AFLC
or its system designers.

It is simply used as an example of an

extensive effort to manage resources, by program elements, which is
unsuccessful because of "spillover" costs. During the seven years
of service test and operation LPHS analysts found no accurate method
to trace common resources.

As long as AFLC is funded through the

appropriation account method and accounting for consumption remains
their respo�sibility, there is no way to account for over $2.1 bil;
lion worth of expenditures.

1AFLC Drochure, Logistic Programs Management System - LPMS,
used as a handout to accompany �arly briefings on the system, p. 3.
2
In an interview with Mr. B. Herbert; LPHS System Manager, he
conce<led that the corranon usage resources presented a dilemma. He
conceded that the system probably would be used only internal to
AFLC and had limited potential to support the DOD program budget.

CHAPTER IV
AFLC UNDER COMPLETE INDUSTRIAL AND STOCK FUND OPERATIONS
The Need for· Revision
The Department of Defense planning-programming-budgeting system
was designed to free the defense establishment from sore of the unde
sireable qualities of the appropriations type budget.

The new system

is to provide th� decision-makers with the information necessary to
determine rational choices.

The program budget has created, for the

most part, the resource input-output measurement apparatus for the
mission forces.

The support forces are still faced with the problem

of relating inputs to outputs.

They have no output or mission; their

role is to assist other organizations fulfill a mission.

However,

while the support units have no direct output, they are responsible
for managing large inputs and for identifying the program elements
that consume the resources.
It is the thesis of this paper that support organizations,
using the �ir Force Logistics Command as the example, cannot provide
ireaningful financial•data to top defense management.

The extensive

commonality of services and materiel cause support units to input
inaccurate information to the program budget.

Complete participa

tion and reporting from all defense organizations require a new
attitude towards support units.

They must be recognized a& non-
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mission groups and must not be expected to make determinations con
cerning costs which are out of their control.
The organizations which directly create an output {mission)
should also account for all the inputs.

The only·way true consump

tion can be recorded is at the time it actually occurs. Any other
method is hypothetical.

To do this, all the appropriation funds' must

be given to mission organizations, and then the input-output measure
ment would emanate in all cases from the one creato� and consumer.
The author,proposes that all annual appropriations be given to
the defense commands which perform a direct military mission.

Only

output producers would have money to buy inputs. All support organi
zations, excepting the research and development area, should operate
from the funds they receive for their services, production or mate
rial.

In essence, the support units should be stock or industrial

funded.

These organizations would no longer operate under the func

tional appropriations budget.
Stock and industrial funds are not new to the DOD.
ing fund concept has existed in the Navy since 1893.

The revolv

They had never

_been widely used until Mr. McNamara became the Secretary of Defense.
Since that time the Defense Supply Agency (DSA) has been established.
The agency manages items and services which are common to more than
one military departrrent.

Such items as medical supplies and common

clothing and services such as central cataloging and traffic manage
ment are under DSA control.
funded.

The entire DSA is stock or in�ustrially

It has eleven divisions which manage almost $4.O billion
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,vorth of resources and annually sell $2.0 billion worth of material
and services to DOD customers.1

The Air Force transacted approximately $1.8 billion worth of
business in fiscal year 1966 under the special funding techniques.
AF1..C manages four out of the seven Air Force divisions using stock
or industrial fund operation; they are Aviation: Fuels, Commissary,
Clothing and Laundry/Drycleaning. Each of the divisions are now in a
transition phase leading to integration with DSA but the last year
all were in AFLC, ·FY 1965, they totaled about $1.3 billion worth of
sales.

The purpose for listing these facts is to point out that the

command has experience in the use of stock and industrial funds.

The

implementation of the author's proposal would not present a technique
that AF1..C has not already handled.
Proposed AF1..C Stock and Industrial Fund
The ba.sic purpose of this proposal is to insure that the respon
sibility center, or the mission producer, is aware· of all inputs.
Hore specifically, as Comptro;J..ler Anthony states, that nhe is charged
with the ••• costs that he incurs in accomplishing his task - both
the labor and material costs incurred directly in the responsibility
center and also the value of the services furnished him by other •••
2
centers.11
1

Department of Defense, Supply Hana ment Reference Book, DA
Pamphlet No. 700-1 (Washington D.C., 1965 rpp. 52-63.
2Robert N. Anthony, "Nei-1 Frontiers in Defense Financial Hanage
ment," The Federal Accountant Vol. XI (June 1962), p. 22. -

j
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The Air Force responsibility centers are the individual air
bases under the present definition since base organizations deal
directly with the external support units.

The base commander pro

vides services to all organizations on his post regardless of command.
For example, Olmsted AFB was an AFLC installation and was commanded
by logistics personnel.

However, an Air Defense Command squadron

was also in place at Olmsted.

It was a "tenant" organization.

The

base commander supported the tenant in the same manner as he serviced
his own group. ,Supplies, spares, maintenance, equipment, etc.,

were

obtained by the tenant through the base commander's organization.l
The installation commander is the resource manager for the entire
base and collectively, are the real managers of almost all Air Force
resources because their units consume the assets.
The responsibility center, under the author's proposed system,
must be the one level below the base commander.

The individual ten

ant units, �nd there are no bases without tenants, become the mission
producing center.

This is done to break the major air commands into

totally separate accounting units.

If this is not done, then

resources consumed by, hypothetically, an Air Defense Command (ADC)
squadron located on a Air Training Command (ATC) base would errone
ously be charged to ATC.

Each command is in a separate force struc�

ture and therefore costs would not be properly apportioned.
1The past tense is used in reference to Olmsted AFB since it is
now being closed. This phased-out base is used as an example because
no breach of security is possible in this instance.
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Generally the tenant units are broken into the following organiza
tions:
1. Wing - A bomber wing usually is made up of 45 aircraft.
and a fighter wing of 72 aircraft.
2.

Squadron - Usually three 15 aircraft squadrons compro
mise a bomber wing and four 18 plane squadrons make
up a fighter wing.

3.

Detachment - One-third of a bomber or fighter squadron.

Even the detachment size unit represents sizeable annual consumption
as the cost of aircraft spares equals 28.6% of aircraft acquisition
price.

The average aircraft price is $1,859,000 and the average

spares costs per airplane is $532,000.

Each plane is not fitted each

year with its total spare part inventory but approximately seventy
percent of the spares have yearly transaction experience.1

Prior to stock and industrial funding AFLC, each major air
command is to be given an account number. Within the separate com
mands each subordinate organization such as wing or squadron is to
be given a sub-account number which is related to the command number.
The intra-command identifications will depend upon the deploymant of
its units.

In some instances a wing will be assigned a sub-account

and in other cases a detachirent will require a separate account.
Whatever the breakdown is, each account unit will have to be given
0 & M money in order to individually purchase goods or services from
the central revolving funds.

The amount of money that the commands,

1The figures are part of· the research project described in
footnote 1 on page 60.
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and their sub-units, will initially receive should be based upon the
Inventory Manager (IM)/System Support Manager (SSM) reliability and
maintainability computations.

The wealrness of these hypothetical

figures has been discussed but the author believes that they are
valid enough on which to base the first year's operation. Also, the
computations are the only figures available to support projected
usage. After the first year, adjustments to command funding will
occur as true consumption becomes the basis for financial apportionrnents.
Currently there are Department of Defense and Air Force
restrictions on the use and scope of stock and industrial funds.
Stock funds only include the procurement price, first destination
transportation costs and surcharges for losses, deterioration, etc.,
of the stock items.

The personnel, administrative and warehousing

costs incident to materiel management are not included in the fund
and the consumer price does not include these costs; they are still
funded through the regular appropriations channels. Also, many
items are excluded from stock fund coverage due to special charac
teristics.

The primary exclusion is recoverable items coded for

depot level repair) The primary limitation on industrial funds is
that they do not include support costs such as transportation, non
depot administration and non-organizational storage.

The only costs

lDepartment of Defense Directive, Regulations Governing Stock
Fund Operations, Number 7420.l, August 20, 1965, pp. 11-13 •. The
entire list of excluded items appears on these pages but most of the
items were not relevant to this paper.
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that are included must occur in the Directorate of Maintenance, all
1
These restrictions will have to be lifted
others are excluded.
before the entire AFLC can be specially funded.

This is not a wild

expect.ation on the author's part because both DOD directives men
tioned in footnotes appearing on this page and page 75 have been
revised twice in the past two years.

In each case the purpose and

scope of ·stock·and industrial funds have been extended.

The ensuing

proposals are based on the assumption that the above_ mentioned pro
hibitions .will be eliminated in the interest of improved management.
The first action required to establish a stock fund is to apply
for charter approval from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comp
troller).

The charter includes information on the size of the

operation and the characteristics of the items to be placed in the
fund.

This first step should be fairly simple since AFLC would not

be assuming a new workload but would rrerely be describing their
existing functions and their size.
The second step is to capitalize the assets. This would entail
a complete capitalization of items, services and facilities. Each
Air Materiel Area (AMA) would have to segregate its entire expendi
tures and apportion them to the appropriate materiel management
division, excluding those costs which support depot maintenance
lDepartment of Defense Directive, Regulations Governing
Industrial Fund Operations, Number 7410.4, July 7, 1965, pp. 6-8.
For a refined breakout peculiar to Air Force requirements see Depart
ment of Air Force, Air Force Industrial Fund, Charter for.Depot
Maintenance, an undated brochure distributed in 1966.
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programs.

This would mean the Directorate of Procurement, the

Directorate of Supply and Transportation and the staff offices would
divide their support expenditures between the various Inventory
Managerrent (IM) and System Support Manager (SSH) divisions.

Also,

the facilities such as warehouses and office space _would h_ave to be
capitalized.

All due-in assets, which already have obligated funds

attached to them, also have to be capitalized as well as any con
struction in progress.
The variou� resource segirents will have to be gathered from
many sources and converted into one total.
procedure but it is possible.

This will not be a simple

The item inventory value plus due-in

assets is mechanically maintained and updated.
easiest to ascertain.
erty accounts.

This cost is the

The facility costs are kept in the real prop

While the costs represent acquisition rather than

replacement prices, they are adequate because facility capitalization
is done to draw a line between existing ones and future buildings.
That is, the value of present facilities will not be part of a con
sumer item price but subsequent building costs must be integrated
into the commodity costs.
cult to determine.

Personnel services will be the most diffi

They will have to be negotiated between the

materiel management division and all the units which support it.
The author suggests that IM/SSH teams be established to go into the
support directorates to determine the personnel resources that each
materiel management division requires.

Periodically, in t�e past,

manpower surveys have been conducted on an AMA-wide scale by high
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ranking AMA personnel. These teams would investigate manpower needs
and allocations in outside directorates.

Upon their reports, per

sonnel reallocation and organizational revisions occurred which

reflected current and projected workloads.1 These same type of teams

could be used to determine the people who support a particular com
modity management division.

The sum total of inventory, facilities

and personnel services will represent the capitalized value of the
fund. Each materiel management division, either IM or SSM, will be
a separate stock fund.
Besides a capitalized value, the stock funds require working
capital.

Such capital is necessary to procure items on which little

or no sales have been recorded.

For example an item may have a pro

curement lead-time of nine months.

Between the time the contract is

awarded and item delivery is made, there is a nine month time lapse.
Obviously the item manager cannot wait until sufficient sales or
orders are made before a new contract is awarded because nine months
will go by before the assets are again on hand. The item manager
must anticipate consumption and order nine months prior to a requi
sition.

This will require money from which there is no immediate

reimbursement so an operating capital account is needed. The amount
should be based on the average item lead-ti1re minus the due-in from
production assets.
1The author worked on the final phases of the Middletown AHA
manpower survey. Titled, Project Shrimp Boat, the survey caused over
800 personnel reassignments out of a total manpower strength of
10,000 and over 100 organizational changes.
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The major air command would be appropriated money, in their
normal categories such as 57 X 3010 and 57 X 3400, according to the
IM/SSH requirements computations.

However, the stock fund operating

�apital will have to be subtracted from this figure for the first
year to avoid a large increase in logistics appropriations.

After

the -first year, few items have a lead-time of more than one year; the
operating account will be self sustaining and money equal to its total
amount would be added to the annual major air command appropriations.
AFLC would no lo�ger receive ·congressional functional appropriations.
Only the mission units would receive money through the traditional
account procedures.
Stock item prices would reflect all resources currently being
input to support the item.

This not only includes administrative,

.

personnel, transportation, acquisition and storage costs but also
charges to compensate for losses, deterioration and damage.

In other

words the stock fund, once established, has to completely sustain ·
itself through its annual sales.

Except in emergencies such as the

Cuban crisis, and grants to non-paying customers such as a foreign
country, no Congressional appropriation should be required after the
first year's operation.
The goal of all stock funds is, and should continue, to break
even.

Total expenditures should equal total.sales.

Stock fund

managers are respons�ble for maintaining business-type accounts to
show·their position relative to the break-even point.

Basically the

requirements for bookkeeping are parallel to private business
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accounts.

XIII.

The requirements, listed in AFR 177-2SC, are:

REQUIREHENTS FOR ACCOUNTING
A.

The establishment of a satisfactory system of finan
cial and quantity accounting for property is a pre
requisite for the complete establishment of stock
fund operations.

B.

The following minimum requirements shall be observed
in accounting for materials, supplies, and equipment
under stock funds:
1.

Summary (or control) accounts for transactions
and stock balances shall be maintained in
financial terms by the stock classifications
adopted for supply management purposes.

2.

Stock transactions shall be sununarized in
financial terms not less frequently than monthly,
for recording in the aforementioned summary (or
control) accounts. Such summarization may uti
lize manual, mechanical, electrical, or EDP
methods, and shall be susceptible of reference
to the supporting docwnents.

3.

A standard pro forma chart of financial control
accounts is prescribed under separate DOD
Instruction (reference (k)). These financial
accounts are designed to facilitate the prepar
ation of financial reports.

4.

Detailed stock records (by items) shall be main
tained in support of the financial summary (con
trol) accounts referred to in subparagraph 1.
above, but it will not be required that the
detailed item records show prices or the amounts
of the transactions in financial terms. Such
transactions may be priced solely on the docu
ments or the summary listings referred to in
subparagraph 2. above. This requirement is not
applicable to certain retail activities, such as
sales stores using simplified procedures for
accounting for low-value items and where trans
actions and inventory balances are recorded in
financial terms only without the maintenance of
quantity data. Other procedures for·simplified
inventory accounting are authorized for low
value materiel in accordance with criteria
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established in reference (1) for application at
bases and depot maintenance facilities.
5. All identifiable losses of materiel or disposals
for any cause, as well as normal issues, shall
be recorded promptly and documented with author
ized completed forms, except that sales stores
issues may be recorded by cash.registers or
other appropriate mechanisms for control.
6.

Except when otherwise provided to rreet the
requirements of the General Accounting Office,
the original docwnents supporting stock trans
actions shall be retained at the site where the
basic financial or stock records of the stock
fund are maintained.

7.

Periodic or continuous, rotating physical checks
of stock items shall be made, and the stock
records and summary {control) accounts shall be
adjusted in accordance therewith. As a general
rule, physical inventories of stock funds shall
be taken not less frequently than once each year.
However, exceptions to this general rule will be
permitted to allow for less frequent physical
inventorying of certain types of items, i.e.,
relative slow-moving, nonpilferable, low mone
tary value, and other types of items where stor
age conditions and lack of movement insure ade
quate physical protection and accuracy of the
records. In addition, statistical sampling
methods are authorized to measure the results of
the entire inventory {or portion thereof) from
the sample of items examined on a scientific
basis. At least annually, all detailed item
records shall be price-extended, and the total
compared with the respective summary (control)
accounts; this check necessarily nrust be inde
pendent of physical inventory-taking where con
tinuous rotating physical checks of items are
made; but in the case of complete, periodic
physical checks, this check must be an integral
part of the physical inventory procedure. Any
significant differences should be investigated
and explained; errors.disclosed by investigation
should be corrected, and any unlocated differ
ences should be adjusted in the summary {control)
accounts.
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8.

Adjustments of book inventories (stock-recorded
item balances) to agree with physical checks
shall be made currently as physical inventories
are taken (item by item if on a rotating basis).
Bookkeeping adjustments shall represent generally
only such adjustment of the summary (control)
accounts as are required to maintain agreement
thereof with the supporting detailed stock
records (whether or not such_ adjustments are
determined in connection with taking physical
inventories). These adjustments shall be clas
sified in the accounts by stock reporting clas
sifications.1

These requirements only include asset accountability but extending
them to cover other expenditures does not appear to be difficult.
Accounts for expenditures, revenues, inventories, etc., are kept but
only relative to inventories. Adding the other costs of personnel
and administration to the existing accounts should not create serious
problems.

The complete account structure is listed in DOD Directive

7420.l and AFR 177-2SC but the same system can be found in any gen
eral accounting textbook.
AFL� depot maintenance operations are almost ideally set up for
industrial funding.

The depot repair facilities have used an indus

trial cost accounting system for almost fourteen years.

The system

relates all input costs to output production. Every labor, material,
_facility upkeep, etc�, charge is computed and identified to a unit of
production.

Each line item produced in the shops has a total,

separate price attached to it.

The only drawback is that non-direc

torate costs are not included.

Such expenses as storage and trans-

1Departirent of Air Force, Air Force Stock Fund, Air Force
Regulation 177-25C (Washington, 19 November 1965), pp. 30-32.
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portation of maintenance material, which are accrued outside the
directorate, are not costed against,·production. ;Survey- te·ams/ similar
to those proposed to determine total costs in the materiel area, can
be used for the industrial funds also.
Each maintenance depot, there will be one at each of the five
permanent AMA's, will constitute a separate industrial fund.

The

breakout into distinct industrial fund operations should not be
difficult.

Each depot now has a separate accounting system and

generally a unique workload so they are practically individual enti
ties under the present organization structure.
The details presented relative to establishing and operating a
stock fund equally apply to an industrial fund.

The fund must be

capitalized, operating capital must be provided, sales prices should
equal total input cost and future construction must be built into
the new production prices.
The m�jor air commands, their bases and sub-units will be the
focal point in the logistics transactions between them and the stock/
industrial funded AFLC organizations.

The stock and industrial

funded groups will have some dealings with each other but these will
be incident to supporting the bases and will be charged to the using
commands.

Ultimately, the non-AFLC units will have to pay the total

bill for all logistics services and goods.

An example of a current

industrial fund situation will probably assist in understand�ng the
proposed system operation.

The Military Airlift Command (MAC) is

presently an industrial funded corrmand.

MAC charges its users for
,

its air transportation services but it also must reimburse any organ
ization that provides MAC with support.

AFLC has the only mainte-

nance depots in the Air Force and MAC requires periodic overhaul of
its aircraft, engines and-accessory parts.

Each year the command

negotiates a schedule with AFLC for its total depot maintenance
repair.

AFLC then allocates _or budgets separately for that amount of

workload.
ported.

It insures that the negotiated MAC schedule will be· sup
Prices are determined at the start of each .year but they

can be renegotiated quarterly.

MAC generates items which need repair

into the depot as close to the schedule as possible.

This is the

only way to insure that resources to support the workload will be
available.

If the schedule cannot be followed or is unrealistic it

rrrust be renegotiated.

The depots will not allow production idleness

and the resources will be shifted to another workload and MAC loses
support.

After repair production is costed and recorded the items

are returne� to MAC with a bill.

AFLC is then reimbursed for its

In the event that prices vary from the negotiated price

services.

schedule, either up or down, they are reviewed and adjusted to
reflect current costs.

Maintenance only receives a portion of the

reinmursement since centrally procured spares are not bought out of
its money.

The appropriate IM/SSH divisions are reimbursed, from

maintenance, for parts consumption occurring during depot repair.
Each directorate receives the payment equal to resource expenditures
on MAC.

During fiscal year 1966, Afl.C received $45,527,000 worth of

reimbursements for overhaul maintenance.

This was within $100,000
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of the original negotiated schedule.

This example tends to bear out

two facts; the commands can operate in a business-like manner between
themselves and, in this case at least, do it very successfully.1

The author's proposal to entirely stock/industrial fund AFLC
requires no organization changes.
intact.

The present structure is left

The only change is in funding.

Currently, AFLC receives

appropriations to logistically support the Air Force; under the
proposed concept the mission commands� only;, would �eceive appropri
ations.

These wpuld be in the same categories that Congress annually

uses to distribute defense dollars.

The support organizations would

be indirectly funded through the using commands.

The revision has no

structural importance but it has great managerial significance.
Benefits of the Stock/Industrial Fund
The primary benefit, in the author's opinion is that top
defense man�gement will be more able to make correct decisions if
AFLC is stock/industrial funded.

The planning-programming-budgeting

technique now used to plan defense requirements rrrust be supported by
accurate cost data.

Current information from support organizations

cannot be accurate because of common usage and undetermined consump
tion.

These causes would be eliminated under the proposed funding

procedures.

Charging each command, through its bases and sub-units,

lFigures in the above example were received in an interview
with Mr. Frank Thomas, ·AFLC Monitor for MAC depot funds. The author
verified the figures in the AFLC Maintenance Engineering Resources
Plan and the AFLC K-262 Report.
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for all resource consumption will permit pure cost data to evolve.
The mission or output producing organizations will be appropri
ated all the Air Force dollars and ultimately will have to· account for
all expenditures.

As previously stated, each connnand and its weapon

systems fit neatly into the program and program element structure of
the FYFS & FP.

Therefore a direct and total cost relationship between

plans and operations will evolve.
expenditures can be compared.

Projected resource usage and real

Alternatives, for the first time cor

rectly costed, c�n be weighed and chosen with more accuracy.

Cost

effectiveness studies and simulations will have more validity than
former efforts.

The entire area of military planning will have a

more solid base as a result of the improved cost data.
Supporting military planning is the primary purpose and benefit
·of the proposed funding revision.

However, there are nwnerous other

benefits.
The sy-stem should motivate "responsibility center" managers to
become more concerned about the use of resources than they are at
present.

Lt. General Merrell, Air Force Comptroller, supported this

position when he said:
Historically, a commander has been concerned mainly with the
items and services he bought from his allotted funds. These
amount to about 20 to 30 percent of the resources consumed at
base level. The remaining percent includes military pay,
centrally procured materiel ani depot maintenance which are
furnished as "free" resources.
ltt. General J. G. Merrell, "How Air Force Project FIRM Could
Help Wing/Dase Level Commanders," Armed Forces Management, Vol. 12 No. 7 (April, 1966), •P• 78. General Merrell-is the Air Force Comp
troller.

Without the "free"· resources the commander will be forced to review
consumption areas that previously caused him little concern. Another
benefit directly related to management motivation would be requisi
tioning integrity.

The author believes that some of .the current

excessive requisitions, so-called extras for unexpected contingencies,
would be eliminated if the money were coming out of the commander's
budget.
One of the original goals of the program budget was to have
success determined by output, not by being able to spend within an
appropriation limit.

The industrial/stock funding system will at

least eliminate this tendency within AFLC.

In previous years the

criterion for success, reflecting the author's attitude, has been to
match appropriations with expenditures.

Proponents of the stock/

industrial fund technique argue:
The utilization of annual appropriations (i.e., one-year funds)
as a funding device presents obstacles to economical supply
manag�ment. The supply manager may, for a variety of reasons,
find himself confronted with unexpected (or unobligated) funds,
as the expiration date for the utilization of these funds
nears. This creates a pressure on the manager to spend (or
obligate) these unused fund balances. If the funds are per
mitted to expire, the indication is that in all probability
certain planned activities were not accomplished. Furthermore,
to permit the funds to expire would violate one of the oldest
budget �upport axioms in existence; i.e., full utilization of
current funds is prima-facie justification for at least an •. ·
equal amount for the subsequent year.
Because of this pressure, the supply manager may make hasty and
possibly uneconomical procurement�. These procurements may
have compounding effects by contributing to an inventory build
up if such items _are not actively demanded. Conversely, the
supply manager may find himself confronted with low inventory
levels and a shortage of funds near the close of the fiscal
year. It may be advisable to buy stocks but, because of fund
_
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limitation, he may have to buy material in small quantities,
even though it would otherwise be desirable to combine the
small procurement with more economical quantities to be bought
with funds from the succeeding year's appropriation.1
Another benefit might be a check on the resources expended in
the support organizations.

The amount of resources consumed will be

directly reflected in the prices charged for goods and services.
Currently there is no real mechanism which places a cost on the
services and goods provided by AF1..C.

When prices are attach.ed co�

parison cost studies could be made with the private sectors of the
economy providing similar products.

The author realizes that mili

tary requirements, especially those needing expeditious processing,
differ from commercial needs.

Nevertheless, one can suspect that too

many wasteful excesses are hidden behind the "differences" between
the two sectors of the economy.

Also, the using commands would tend

to reduce waste because high prices are bound to arouse anguish and
probably Inspector General visits.
Conclusion
The Department of Defense has instituted a new system which
relates military planning to budgeting.

The programming document

lists present and projected resource allocations.

A rather complete

resource input and output relationship has been prepared.

The author

believes that the program budget has definitely improved defense manlLt. Colonel Jack w. Coleman, "Efficiency and Working-Capital
Funds," The Federal Accountant, Vol. X - No. 3 (March, 1961), p. 9.
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agement decision-making abilities.

Total costs, alternatives and

program evaluations are provided by the system.

All are prerequisites

to making good decisions.
The program budget, although it has been an assist to manage
ment, contains some inaccurate data.

Inputs are measured in terms of

resource expenditures and outputs in terms of missions and capability
·to perform the missions.

Resources are allocated to mission and non

mission, support organizations.

A direct input - o�tput ratio is

possible when ex�mining mission assigned resources.
case when auditing support expenditures.

This is not the

Due to commonality and in

direct consumption, many costs are pro-rated and inaccuracies are
recorded in the program budget.

These inaccuracies distort the

decision-maker's view and subsequent choices.
The author contends that such distortions are serious because
they involve billions of dollars.

Further,, .- a· pasic cause for the

inaccurate data is the use of the functional account appropriations
system.

As long as functions remain the basis for fund and expendi

ture accounts in those organizations which do not have a direct out-·
put, the true resource input-output relationship can-never be deter
mined.

Actuai cost data can be input to the program budget only

when all appropriations are made to the output producing, or mission
units.

In order to accomplish this financial arrangement, support

organizations such as the Air Force Logistics Command should be
stock and industrial funded.

Only mission commands should be

directly funded by Congress.

This would place all the resource

1

inputs and outputs in the mission units.

One source would provide all

the data to the progranming document and it would be complete and
reliable.
Without complete stock and industrial funding the Department of
Defense must continue to base military planning on.inadequate data.
Without-placing responsibility for consumption on the consumer the
data will continue to be inadequate.
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